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LOWERING STANDARDS: THE SIMULTANEOUSSCHOOL-BOMBING-AND-SHOOTING-THREAT
EXCEPTION OF ARMIJO EX REL. ARMIJO
SANCHEZ V. PETERSON
Jeff Fisher*

I. INTRODUCTION
On September 22, 2006, anonymous callers made two bomb threats
to Oñate High School in Las Cruces, New Mexico. Before the threats, the
school’s principal had heard rumors that students planned to bring guns
to school that day, call in a false bomb threat, and, as soon as the other
students exited the school, open fire. Based on these facts, a tip, and ultimately some inaccurate additional information, the investigating officers
concluded that Christopher Armijo was one of the callers. The officers
thus went to Chris’s house, entered through an unlocked door, got Chris
out of bed, handcuffed him, and took him outside to stand on the porch
in his underwear while they searched his house. After the officers concluded that Chris did not make any of the calls, they removed his handcuffs and left.
The United States is considered one of the freest countries in the
world and its citizens among the freest. U.S. citizens are assumed to be
free, to a great extent, from unreasonable government intrusions into
their lives. That freedom was important enough that the Founding Fathers memorialized it in the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution,
which generally requires law enforcement officers to obtain a warrant
based on probable cause before entering a person’s home.1
Nevertheless, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found
that the officers’ entry into Chris’s house absent a warrant or probable

*
Jeff Fisher is a 2009 graduate of Baylor University School of Law. Upon
graduation, he clerked for U.S. District Judge James O. Browning in the District of
New Mexico. He is now an associate at the Law Offices of Joel B. Rudin. Mr. Fisher
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matchmaker, and to his co-clerk, Ashley Kelly, for bringing him endless joy. He also
thanks Professor Brian Serr for his thoughtful critique. The views expressed in this
article, however, are solely those of Mr. Fisher.
1. U.S. CONST. amend IV.
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cause did not violate the Fourth Amendment.2 It held that the dire nature
of the circumstances justified the police entrance under a lesser standard.3
For the first time, the Tenth Circuit allowed officers to use the emergency-aid exception to the probable cause requirement to enter a home
in the context of a criminal investigation. The purpose of this article is to
discuss the legal foundation of that case—Armijo ex rel. Armijo Sanchez
v. Peterson—its potential scope, and its consequences. That discussion
will attempt to clarify the line, blurred by Armijo, between two exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirements: the exigent circumstances exception and the emergency-aid exception.
Part II will introduce some general Fourth Amendment concepts,
including the warrant and probable cause requirement for home searches.
Part III will outline the history and scope of the exigent circumstances
exceptions and a variant that the Supreme Court of the United States
refers to as the emergency-aid exception. Part IV will discuss the Armijo
case, its holding, and the Honorable Mary Beck Briscoe’s dissent. Part V
will review how Armijo extended the exigent circumstances exception beyond those “specifically established and well-delineated exceptions”4 that
the Supreme Court has recognized, and how that extension compromised
the sanctity of the home that the Fourth Amendment was intended to
protect.
II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT’S WARRANT AND PROBABLE
CAUSE REQUIREMENTS
The Fourth Amendment defines the liberty that the people of the
United States have with respect to government searches and seizures. It
states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall

2. Armijo ex rel. Armijo Sanchez v. Peterson, 601 F.3d 1065, 1071–72, 1075
(10th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1473 (2011).
3. Id.
4. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (“[S]earches conducted
outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”) (footnote omitted); see also Arizona v. Gant,
129 S. Ct. 1710, 1716 (2009) (“[O]ur analysis begins, as it should in every case addressing the reasonableness of a warrantless search, with the basic rule that ‘searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are
per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically
established and well-delineated exceptions.’ ”) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 357).
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not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.5

Broadly put, this provision protects “the people” from unreasonable government intrusions into their private lives. Its precise meaning, however,
is not obvious. For example, what is a “reasonable” search or seizure?
After stating that “the people [will be] secure . . . against unreasonable
searches and seizures,” it states that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause.”6 The provision discusses warrants and probable cause in
the same sentence as it discusses unreasonable searches and seizures, but
the relationship between the two concepts is unclear. Does this language
mean that searches and seizures are only reasonable when made pursuant
to a warrant? Is a warrant merely one method by which a search or
seizure may be reasonable? Or are the two clauses only tangentially related, and the warrant clause relates to some other aspect of government
infringement on the people’s liberty? Such ambiguities were left up to the
Supreme Court to resolve.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court concluded that the two clauses of
the Fourth Amendment are closely linked. It is not an absolute requirement, but police generally must obtain a warrant before they execute a
search or seizure.7 Courts are to presume searches executed without a
warrant are unreasonable, and such searches violate the Fourth Amendment unless some exception to that general rule applies.8 The core requirement is reasonableness, but sometimes reasonableness can be

5. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
6. Id.
7. See Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011) (“Although the text of the
Fourth Amendment does not specify when a search warrant must be obtained, this
Court has inferred that a warrant must generally be secured.”).
8. See Michigan v. Fisher, 130 S. Ct. 546, 548 (2009) (“[A]lthough ‘searches and
seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable,’ that presumption can be overcome.”) (internal citation omitted); Brigham City v. Stuart, 547
U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (“It is a ‘basic principle of Fourth Amendment law that searches
and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.’ ”)
(quoting Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 559 (2004)); Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S.
326, 330 (2001) (“We have said, for example, that in ‘the ordinary case,’ seizures of
personal property are ‘unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourt Amendment,’
without more, ‘unless . . . accomplished pursuant to a judicial warrant,’ issued by a
neutral magistrate after finding probable cause.”) (quoting Unites States v. Place, 462
U.S. 696, 701 (1983)).
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achieved without a warrant.9 It is nevertheless helpful to begin with an
understanding of how the warrant and probable cause requirements work
in an average case, where a police officer needs to enter a person’s home
to search for evidence of a crime.
Generally, if a citizen does not voluntarily consent to a search, the
only way law enforcement may overcome the Fourth Amendment’s protection—and thereby lawfully enter a person’s home to search—is to collect information constituting probable cause to believe that there is
criminal evidence inside.10 The officer must then take that information to
a magistrate, who will review the officer’s affidavit and make an independent assessment as to whether the information therein does, in fact, constitute probable cause.11 If the magistrate is convinced that the warrant

9. See McArthur, 531 U.S. at 330 (stating that the Fourth Amendment’s “ ‘central requirement’ is one of reasonableness,” but noting that “[w]e nonetheless have
made it clear that there are exceptions to the warrant requirement.”); see also id.
(“When faced with special law enforcement needs, diminished expectations of privacy, minimal intrusions, or the like, the Court has found that certain general, or
individual, circumstances may render a warrantless search or seizure reasonable.”).
10. See Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2639 (2009)
(“Probable cause exists where ‘the facts and circumstances within [an officer’s] knowledge and of which [he] had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in
themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that’ an offense has
been or is being committed, and that evidence bearing on that offense will be found in
the place to be searched.”) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–76
(1949)) (internal citation omitted); id. (“Perhaps the best that can be said generally
about the required knowledge component of probable cause for a law enforcement
officer’s evidence search is that it raise a ‘fair probability’ or a ‘substantial chance’ of
discovering evidence of criminal activity.”) (internal citations omitted); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 35 (1963) (“[P]robable cause . . . exists where the facts and circumstances within . . . [the officers’] knowledge and of which they had reasonably
trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable
caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed.”) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Tobin, 923 F.2d 1506, 1510 (11th
Cir. 1991) (en banc) (“[P]robable cause exists where the facts lead a reasonably cautious person to believe that the search will uncover evidence of a crime.”) (internal
quotations omitted).
11. See e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(1) (“[A] magistrate judge with authority in
the district—or if none is reasonably available, a judge of a state court of record in the
district—has authority to issue a warrant to search for and seize a person or property
located within the district[.]”). The primary import of the magistrate requirement is
that the individual issuing the warrant be a judicial officer, independent of the executive branch of government, and that the independent judicial officer makes his own
probable cause determination, unaffected by the probable cause determination of the
police officer seeking the warrant. See Dow v. Baird, 389 F.2d 882, 884 (10th Cir.
1968) (“[The Fourth Amendment] requires the interposition of an impartial, disinterested magistrate between the police and the citizen.”). The judicial officer can make
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affidavit reflects probable cause,12 a warrant will be issued that specifically defines the scope of the search it authorizes, i.e., one that “particularly describe[s] the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.”13 It is only once the officer has the warrant in hand that there is
legal authority to enter a person’s home and seize certain things—and the
scope of the warrant strictly limits the officer’s authority.14

the probable cause finding from the calm of his office, and thus is less likely to get
caught up in “the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.” Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1948) (“The point of the Fourth Amendment . . . is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences
which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that
those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being
judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime.”).
12. The Supreme Court has said several times in very certain terms that the
magistrate judge’s probable cause determination must be his or her own, and not
merely an adoption of the investigating officer’s judgment. See United States v. Leon,
468 U.S. 897, 914 (1984) (“[T]he magistrate . . . [must] perform his neutral and detached function and not serve merely as a rubber stamp for the police.”) (quoting
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 111 (1964)) (internal quotation marks omitted); id.
(“A magistrate failing to ‘manifest that neutrality and detachment demanded of a
judicial officer when presented with a warrant application’ and who acts instead as ‘an
adjunct law enforcement officer’ cannot provide valid authorization for an otherwise
unconstitutional search.”) (quoting Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319,
326–27 (1979)); see also Dow, 389 F.2d at 884 (“When a magistrate, as in this case,
acts as a mere rubber stamp for the police a basic constitutional protection with roots
deep in our national history is reduced to so many empty words. That cannot be explained away, condoned, excused or tolerated.”).
13. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
14. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 611 (1999) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment does
require that police actions in execution of a warrant be related to the objectives of the
authorized intrusion[.]”); id. at 619 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (“Police action in the execution of a warrant must be strictly limited to the
objectives of the authorized intrusion.”); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S.
259, 295 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“A warrant . . . defines the scope of a
search and limits the discretion of the inspecting officers.”); Nat’l Treasury Emp’t.
Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 667 (1989) (“A warrant serves primarily to advise
the citizen that an intrusion is authorized by law and limited in its permissible
scope. . . . ”); Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987) (“The manifest purpose
of this particularity requirement was to prevent general searches. By limiting the authorization to search to the specific areas and things for which there is probable cause
to search, the requirement ensures that the search will be carefully tailored to its
justifications . . . .”); Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 656 (1980) (“When an
official search is properly authorized—whether by consent or by the issuance of a
valid warrant—the scope of the search is limited by the terms of its authorization.”)
(citation omitted); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 181–82 (1974) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (“[A] written warrant helps ensure that a search will be limited in scope to
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The Fourth Amendment is a significant limitation on the government’s police power, one that restricts police officers’ ability to investigate and stop crimes. Officers cannot rely on instinct or intuition in
deciding who to search in connection with a criminal investigation. If an
investigating officer has a hunch—even if years of experience and keen
insight into the criminal mind make that hunch likely to be correct—the
officer must still accumulate enough facts to establish probable cause.15
Once the officer has facts constituting probable cause, those facts must be
presented to a magistrate, who will then make an independent probable
cause evaluation. This procedure can be very time consuming, and it
could give a criminal the chance to conceal evidence or escape. The
Fourth Amendment thus represents a judgment call on the part of the
drafters—one that the Supreme Court has decided merits significant respect—that individual liberty is more important than a police officer’s
ability to investigate every suspicion. In other words, some things are
more important than catching criminals, and individual liberty is one of
those things.16
The Supreme Court, on several occasions, has recognized the tradeoff that the Fourth Amendment represents: decreased police effectiveness in exchange for enhanced individual liberty.17 It has crafted the
the areas and objects necessary to the search because both the ‘place to be searched’
and the ‘things to be seized’ must be described with particularity.”); Dow, 389 F.2d at
884 (“The constitutional requirement that no search warrants ‘shall issue but upon
probable cause supported by Oath or affirmation’ is not to be cavalierly brushed aside
as an empty formality.”). Even where the search is not pursuant to a warrant, the
scope of the search is generally limited to the circumstances that prompted it. See
Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 373 (1993) (“[A] protective search—permitted
without a warrant and on the basis of reasonable suspicion less than probable cause
[i.e., a Terry stop]—must be strictly ‘limited to that which is necessary for the discovery of weapons which might be used to harm the officer or others nearby.’ ”) (quoting
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26 (1968)).
15. See United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273–74 (2002) (noting that a mere
hunch is insufficient even to establish reasonable suspicion, which is a lower standard
than probable cause); United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (“The officer . . . must be able to articulate something more than an ‘inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch.’ ”) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)).
16. See United States v. Acosta, 965 F.2d 1248, 1251 (3d Cir. 1992) (“The warrant requirement guarantees our people the right of freedom from unwarranted government intrusion.”).
17. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 680 (1995) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting) (“ ‘[T]here is nothing new in the realization’ that Fourth Amendment protections come with a price.”) (quoting Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 329 (1987));
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 601 (1991) (“Even if the warrant requirement
does inconvenience the police to some extent, that fact does not distinguish this constitutional requirement from any other procedural protection secured by the Bill of
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Fourth Amendment’s scope with that trade-off in mind. Police officers
would catch more criminals if they did not need a reason to enter a home
and search—they would probably even find evidence of crimes they did
not know had been committed. On the other hand, neither the American
people nor the Constitution would stand for giving police officers that
kind of power. On the contrary, the Supreme Court has stated that “‘the
right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion’ stands ‘at the very core of the Fourth
Amendment.’”18 An officer cannot break into a suspect’s home based on
the mere belief that evidence of a crime might be inside, even if that
belief is correct.19 Rather, the officer must meet both an evidentiary burden (probable cause) and a procedural requirement (the magistrate’s
warrant) before the sanctity of a person’s home can lawfully be invaded.20
The officer cannot enter a suspect’s home based simply on a hunch or
suspicion.21 Such searches, conducted without probable cause and a warrant, are presumed unreasonable—i.e., unconstitutional—unless one of
Rights. It is merely a part of the price that our society must pay in order to preserve
its freedom.”); Hicks, 480 U.S. at 329 (“[T]here is nothing new in the realization that
the Constitution sometimes insulates the criminality of a few in order to protect the
privacy of us all.”); Leon, 468 U.S. at 941 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he loss of that
evidence . . . is the ‘price’ our society pays for enjoying the freedom and privacy
safeguarded by the Fourth Amendment . . . . [I]t is not the exclusionary rule, but the
Amendment itself that has imposed this cost.”) (citation omitted); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 364 (1983) (“The price of [law enforcement] effectiveness, however,
is intrusion on individual interests protected by the Fourth Amendment.”). At the
time of the drafting of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, it made sense for the
Founding Fathers to place personal liberty above the police power of the government.
At that time, the original thirteen colonies had only recently rid themselves of an
oppressive centralized government in England. They were highly suspicious of a government with too much power, and cognizant of the fact that such a government, no
matter how good-intentioned, had the potential to become corrupt and rob its citizens
of the liberty they so cherished. Although the technological, economic, and political
climates have changed, there is no reason to believe that these concerns are any less
poignant today than they were in the late 1700s.
18. Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 559 (2004) (quoting Kyllo v. United States,
533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
19. See Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 304 (1984) (“[I]f probable cause to
believe that the owner committed arson is lacking . . . a mere suspicion that an individual has engaged in criminal activity is insufficient to justify the intrusion on an
individual’s privacy that an unannounced, potentially forceful entry entails.”).
20. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 584 (1980) (“As it was ultimately
adopted . . . the [Fourth] Amendment contained two separate clauses, the first protecting the basic right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and the
second requiring that warrants be particular and supported by probable cause.”) (citation omitted).
21. See supra notes 7–8, 15, 19.

R
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the “specifically established and well-delineated exceptions” to this general rule applies.22
Although the Supreme Court has concluded that “the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places,”23 people have a reasonable expectation of privacy—and thus Fourth Amendment protection—in their
homes.24 The Court has referred to the right to be free from unwarranted

22. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978) (“[S]earches conducted outside
the judicial process, without prior approval by a judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established
and well-delineated exceptions.”) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357
(1967)); Acosta, 965 F.2d at 1251 (“[A] basic principle of Fourth Amendment law is
that warrantless searches and seizures inside a home are presumptively
unreasonable.”).
23. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (“What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even
in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what
he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.”) (internal citations omitted); id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring)
(“My understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that there is a
twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to
recognize as ‘reasonable.’ ”); see also Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32–33 (2001)
(applying Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz as law).
24. See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 603 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(“[P]rivacy and security in the home are central to the Fourth Amendment’s guarantees as explained in our decisions and as understood since the beginnings of the Republic.”); id. at 629–30 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[O]ur Fourth Amendment traditions
place high value upon protecting privacy in the home.”); Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S.
551, 559 (2004) (“[T]he right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free
from unreasonable governmental intrusion stands at the very core of the Fourth
Amendment . . . .”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 340 n.3 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Principled respect for
the sanctity of the home has long animated this Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.”); Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609–610 (1999) (“The Fourth Amendment
embodies [the] centuries-old principle” that “the house of every one is to him as his
castle and fortress, as well for his defence [sic] against injury and violence, as for his
repose.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Minnesota v. Carter, 525
U.S. 83, 99 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The Fourth Amendment protects ‘[t]he
right of the people to be secure in their . . . houses,’ and it is beyond dispute that the
home is entitled to special protection as the center of the private lives of our people.”); id. at 106 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (“[T]he disposition I would reach in this
case responds to the unique importance of the home—the most essential bastion of
privacy recognized by the law.”); Soldal v. Cook Cnty., Ill., 506 U.S. 56, 61 (1992)
(“[W]e have emphasized that ‘at the very core’ of the Fourth Amendment ‘stands the
right of a man to retreat into his own home.’ ”) (internal citation omitted); Maryland
v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 90–91 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“In [Justice
Harlan’s] view, the home would meet this test [of being worthy of Fourth Amendment protection] in virtually all situations.”); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586
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police intrusions into the home as being “at the core of the Fourth
Amendment” and “basic to a free society.”25 And, although much of the
Court’s artful language regarding the Fourth Amendment comes from
cases decided in the 1950s, ’60s, and ’70s, the Court stated in 2001: “At
the very core of the Fourth Amendment stands the right of a man to
retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.”26 The Court stated the principle again, in very similar
words, in its 2006 decision in Groh v. Ramirez.27
The Fourth Amendment’s protections are important enough that
the Supreme Court has found them incorporated into the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, and has thereby held that the Fourth
Amendment restricts the conduct of both state and federal law enforcement officers.28 The Fourth Amendment’s protections are said to be at

(1980) (“[S]earches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively
unreasonable.”); United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for E. Dist. of Mich., 407 U.S. 297,
313 (1972) (“[P]hysical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of
the Fourth Amendment is directed . . . .”); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949)
(“The security of one’s privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police—which is at
the core of the Fourth Amendment—is basic to a free society.”), overruled on other
grounds by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Manzanares v. Higdon, 575 F.3d 1135,
1142–43 (10th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, [and] its foremost concern is the home.”) (citation and quotation marks omitted); United States v. Najar, 451 F.3d 710, 713–14 (10th Cir. 2006)
(“[S]earches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.”) (quoting Payton, 445 U.S. at 586) (internal quotation marks omitted).
25. Wolf, 338 U.S. at 27 overruled on other grounds by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961); see also id. at 27 (calling the Fourth Amendment’s protection “implicit in
‘the concept of ordered liberty’ ”).
26. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511
(1961)).
27. 540 U.S. at 559 (2004) (“[T]he right of a man to retreat into his own home
and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion stands at the very core
of the Fourth Amendment . . . .”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
28. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 n.42 (1977) (“The right of personal security is also protected by the Fourth Amendment, which was made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth because its protection was viewed as implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty.”) (internal quotations and citation omitted); Wolf,
338 U.S. at 27 (“The security of one’s privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police—which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment—is basic to a free society. It is
therefore implicit in “the concept of ordered liberty” and as such enforceable against
the States through the Due Process”); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (holding the
Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule applicable to the States). For a brief description of the exclusionary rule, see infra note 39.

R
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their strongest within the home.29 Courts should thus be cautious when
carving exceptions to the warrant requirement that would allow officers
to enter a home.30 Moreover, the government bears the burden of showing that such an exception applies in a given case.31
III. THE EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES EXCEPTION TO
THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT AND THE
EMERGENCY-AID VARIANT
Anyone who has been in or near law enforcement, or seen a few
episodes of Law and Order,32 realizes that time is often of the essence.
But it is not always reasonable to require the officer to stop the investigation, return to the precinct and draft an affidavit explaining what has
been discovered in the investigation thus far, take another one or two
pages to describe what is expected to be found in the place to be searched
29. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 212–13 (1986) (describing the curtilage doctrine and explaining that the home is “where privacy expectations are most
heightened”); United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 552 n.13 (1982) (“At least since
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886), the Court had acknowledged that the
Fourth Amendment accords special protection to the home.”); Payton, 445 U.S. at 585
(“[T]he ‘physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the
Fourth Amendment is directed.’ ”) (quoting United States v. United States Dist.
Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972)); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561
(1976) (stating that “the sanctity of private dwellings” is “ordinarily afforded the most
stringent Fourth Amendment protection”).
30. See, e.g., United States v. Najar, 451 F.3d 710, 717 (10th Cir. 2006) (“That
burden [to prove an exception to the warrant requirement] is especially heavy when
the exception must justify the warrantless entry of a home.”).
31. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 589 n.5 (1991) (“Because each exception to the warrant requirement invariably impinges to some extent on the protective purpose of the Fourth Amendment, the few situations in which a search may be
conducted in the absence of a warrant have been carefully delineated and ‘the burden
is on those seeking the exemption to show the need for it.’ ”) (quoting United States v.
Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951)); Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34 (1970) (“[O]nly in ‘a
few specifically established and well-delineated’ situations may a warrantless search
of a dwelling withstand constitutional scrutiny . . . . The burden rests on the State to
show the existence of such an exceptional situation.”) (internal citation omitted); Jeffers, 342 U.S. at 51 (“Over and again this Court has emphasized that the mandate of
the [Fourth] Amendment requires adherence to judicial processes. Only [in limited
circumstances] may an exemption lie, and then the burden is on those seeking the
exemption to show the need for it”) (internal citations omitted); United States v.
Huffman, 461 F.3d 777, 782 (6th Cir. 2006) (“If the police enter a home without a
warrant, the entry is presumptively unreasonable unless the government proves otherwise.”) (emphasis added).
32. See Law & Order, NBC.COM, http://www.nbc.com/Law_and_Order/about
(last visited Mar. 5, 2011).
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and what items will likely be seized, take the affidavit and a draft warrant
to a magistrate, and then convince the magistrate that the information
amounts to probable cause. If all of these steps were always required, a
suspect (especially one who knows the investigation is underway) would
have time to remove fingerprints from any incriminating evidence, dump
the evidence somewhere inconspicuous, and maybe even establish an alibi. A more streamlined approach is sometimes necessary.
A. The Exigent Circumstances Exception
The Supreme Court has noted this occasional need for immediate
action, which is why it recognized the exigent circumstances exception to
the warrant requirement.33 Under this exception, an officer may make
warrantless entry into a house or execute a warrantless search if certain
conditions are met. Those conditions are twofold: (1) that the officer has
probable cause to believe there will be evidence of criminality in a particular place, and (2) there is some special circumstance—i.e., an exigent
circumstance—where taking the time necessary to obtain a search warrant is infeasible.34 If waiting to get a warrant might, for example, result in
destruction of evidence, escape of a suspect, or serious harm or death of a
victim, the officer may postpone the magistrate’s review.35 It is not that
probable cause is not required,36 nor that the probable cause finding will
33. See, e.g., New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 653 n.3 (1984) (“We have long
recognized an exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement in the
Fourth Amendment context.”).
34. See infra notes 36–99 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 49–54, 82, 96–99 and accompanying text.
36. On the contrary, most jurisdictions—including the Tenth Circuit—agree that
the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement generally requires
both exigent circumstances and probable cause. See Kirk v. Louisiana, 536 U.S. 635,
638 (2002) (per curiam) (“As Payton makes plain, police officers need either a warrant or probable cause plus exigent circumstances in order to make a lawful entry into
a home.”) (emphasis added); United States v. King, 604 F.3d 125, 147 (3d Cir. 2010)
(Fuentes, J., concurring) (“When Government agents . . . have probable cause to believe contraband is present and . . . they reasonably conclude that the evidence will
be destroyed or removed before they can secure a search warrant, a warrantless
search is justified.”) (quoting United States v. Rubin, 474 F.2d 262, 268 (3d Cir. 1973))
(emphasis added); United States v. Cisneros-Gutierrez, 598 F.3d 997, 1004 (8th Cir.
2010) (stating that to justify a warrantless entry into a home to preserve evidence,
“[n]ot only must the government establish that an exigency existed, but also that there
was probable cause to search the residence”); Estate of Bennett v. Wainwright, 548
F.3d 155, 169 (1st Cir. 2008) (“A warrantless entry into a home without consent . . . may not be unreasonable where the government can demonstrate, in addition to probable cause, the existence of exigent circumstances.”); United States v.
Fiasche, 520 F.3d 694, 698 (7th Cir. 2008) (finding probable cause before doing an
exigent circumstances analysis); West v. Keef, 479 F.3d 757, 759 (10th Cir. 2007)

R
R
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not be reviewed by a detached, neutral magistrate. Rather, the magistrate’s review will (most likely) occur later, probably in the context of: (1)
a motion to suppress whatever evidence was found during the exigent
circumstances entry; or (2) a civil action against the officer under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.
The effect of this exception is that, when exigent circumstances present themselves, an officer can forgo the magistrate’s review and rely on
training and knowledge of the law to determine whether probable cause
exists. If an officer’s probable cause conclusion is incorrect, any evidence
found might be suppressed, or the officer may be found liable for damages in a civil suit.37 Unlike the situation where the officer first obtains a
warrant, in which case the magistrate’s probable cause determination is

(“Thus the sole question in this case is, viewing the record testimony without the
affidavit, whether the officers had both probable cause and exigent circumstances justifying . . . their warrantless entry . . . .”) (emphasis added); United States v. McClain, 444 F.3d 556, 561 (6th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he police may not enter a private
residence without a warrant unless both probable cause plus exigent circumstances
exist.”) (internal quotations and citation omitted); United States v. Santiago, 410 F.3d
193, 198 (5th Cir. 2005) (“A warrantless entry into and search of a dwelling is presumptively unreasonable unless consent is given or probable cause and exigent circumstances justify the encroachment.”); United States v. Johnson, 256 F.3d 895, 905
(9th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (“[E]xigent circumstance[s] relieve[ ] the police of the obligation of obtaining a warrant. The exigent circumstance does not, however, relieve
the police of the need to have probable cause for the search.”) (internal citations
omitted); United States v. Cephas, 254 F.3d 488, 494–95 (4th Cir. 2001) (“[W]here
police officers (1) have probable cause to believe that evidence of illegal activity is
present and (2) reasonably believe that evidence may be destroyed or removed before
they could obtain a warrant, exigent circumstances justify a warrantless entry.”);
United States v. Tobin, 923 F.2d 1506, 1510 (11th Cir. 1991) (“A warrantless search is
allowed, however, where both probable cause and exigent circumstances exist.”);
United States v. MacDonald, 916 F.2d 766, 769–70 (2d Cir. 1990) (en banc) (setting
forth a six-factor analysis for determining when exigent circumstances justify warrantless entry into the home, listing “a clear showing of probable cause. . .to believe that
the suspect committed the crime”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The primary exception to this rule is the emergency-aid exigency, discussed infra Part
III.B.
37. See, e.g., Rodeman v. Foster, 767 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1183 (D. Colo. 2011)
(denying summary judgment in § 1983 suit for damages because disputed factual issues existed regarding whether officer had probable cause to enter plaintiff’s home);
United States v. Tatman, 615 F. Supp. 2d 664, 680, 692 (S.D. Ohio 2008) (suppressing
evidence where officer failed to show exigent circumstances existed); United States v.
Cruz-Roman, 312 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1361–62 (W.D. Wash. 2004) (noting that, “[e]ven
where exigent circumstances exist, the search of a residence . . . must be supported
by probable cause,” and suppressing the evidence because the officer had neither
probable cause nor exigent circumstances).
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given deference,38 a court will not defer to the officer’s probable cause
finding, and the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule39 will not
apply.40 Moreover, if a court later concludes that there was no exigency,
the exigent circumstances exception does not apply and any warrantless
entry constitutes a Fourth Amendment violation.41 In other words, the
stakes are higher and the cost of failure is greater if the officer does not
comply with the warrant procedure.
1. Warden v. Hayden Introduces the Concept of an Exigent
Circumstances Exception to the Warrant Requirement
One of the earliest Supreme Court cases to discuss the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement is Warden v. Hayden.42
In that case, Mr. Hayden robbed the offices of the Diamond Cab Company at gunpoint.43 Two cab drivers followed Mr. Hayden and radioed in
to the dispatcher that he had entered a particular home.44 When the po-

38. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914 (1984) (“Reasonable minds
frequently may differ on the question whether a particular affidavit establishes probable cause, and we have thus concluded that the preference for warrants is most appropriately effectuated by according ‘great deference’ to a magistrate’s determination.”)
(quoting Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 (1969) (citations omitted); United
States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108–109 (1965) (noting that where a warrant describes underlying circumstances and the reliability of unnamed sources, a reviewing
court should defer to the magistrate’s determination).
39. See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 142 (2009) (“When police act
under a warrant that is invalid for lack of probable cause, the exclusionary rule does
not apply if the police acted ‘in objectively reasonable reliance’ on the subsequently
invalidated search warrant.”) (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 922). Generally speaking, the
exclusionary rule is a rule of law stating that evidence that the police obtain as a butfor and proximate result of a constitutional violation is inadmissible in a criminal
prosecution against the person whose constitutional rights were violated. See Murray
v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 536–37 (1988).
40. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 914 (“[W]e have expressed a strong preference for
warrants and declared that ‘in a doubtful or marginal case a search under a warrant
may be sustainable where without one it would fall.’ ”) (quoting Ventresca, 380 U.S. at
106).
41. See, e.g., United States v. Christy, No. CR 10–1534 JB, 2011 WL 2429276, at
*37 n.11 (D.N.M. May 18, 2011) (Browning, J.) (“The Court thus finds that the deputies’ illegally entered Christy’s residence in violation of the Fourth Amendment, because exigent circumstances did not justify their action.”).
42. 387 U.S. 294 (1967). Incidentally, this opinion was issued earlier in the same
year as the seminal Fourth Amendment case of United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347
(1967), which set forth the two-pronged test for determining whether a person has an
expectation of privacy.
43. Warden, 387 U.S. at 297.
44. Id.
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lice arrived a few minutes later and knocked on the door, Mrs. Hayden
answered.45 The officers, without a warrant, told Mrs. Hayden that they
believed a robber had entered her house and asked her for permission to
come inside.46 She gave them permission. Inside the house, the officers
found Mr. Hayden in one room, a pistol and a shotgun in another room,
and clothes that matched those worn by the robber in a washing machine
in a third room.47
The Fourth Circuit found no constitutional violation in the entry or
search, and the Supreme Court agreed.48 The Court based the conclusion
on the fact that, “[u]nder the circumstances of this case, ‘the exigencies of
the situation made [warrantless entry] imperative.’”49 The Court concluded that the officers had acted reasonably, stating: “The Fourth
Amendment does not require police officers to delay in the course of an
investigation if to do so would gravely endanger their lives or the lives of

45. Id.
46. Id. This fact alone should have obviated the need for any exigent circumstances exception analysis. The trial court found that Mrs. Hayden “gave the policeman permission to enter the home.” Id. at 297 n.4. The trial court in Mr. Hayden’s
federal habeas case, however, “concluded that resolution of [the consent] issue would
be unnecessary, because the officers were ‘justified in entering and searching the
house for the felon, for his weapons and for the fruits of the robbery.’ ” Id. There was
no reason to engage in the extensive legal discussion of whether the exigent circumstances permitted the officers to enter when it was established that police entries
based on voluntary consent were constitutional. See Zap v. United States, 328 U.S.
624, 628 (1946) (“[T]he law of searches and seizures as revealed in the decisions of
this Court is the product of the interplay of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. But
those rights may be waived.”). Given that the trial court made the factual finding—
which was not clearly incorrect—that Mrs. Hayden had given consent, it is unclear
why the Supreme Court did not take this route. Perhaps the Court foresaw, and
wanted to avoid, the potentially tricky issue of whether one spouse’s voluntary consent to a search would keep such a search from violating the other spouse’s Fourth
Amendment rights. It would be seven years before the Supreme Court directly addressed that issue and concluded that spousal consent grants officers authority to
search the marital home. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974) (“[W]hen
the prosecution seeks to justify a warrantless search by proof of voluntary consent, it
is not limited to proof that consent was given by the defendant, but may show that
permission to search was obtained from a third party who possessed common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected.”); id. at 177 (holding that “the Government sustained its burden of proving
by the preponderance of the evidence that Mrs. Graff’s voluntary consent to search
the east bedroom was legally sufficient to warrant admitting” certain evidence against
her husband).
47. Warden, 387 U.S. at 298.
48. See id. at 296–97.
49. Id. at 298 (quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948)).
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others.”50 While the officers did not have a warrant, they had probable
cause to believe Mr. Hayden was inside based on eyewitness reports from
the cab drivers who followed him to the residence.51 The exigency arose
from not knowing whether the residence belonged to Mr. Hayden: if he
ran into the house of a stranger, armed as he was, his presence would
pose a clear danger to the resident.52 Alternatively, the Court might arguably have based its holding on the notion of “hot pursuit.”53 The robbery had occurred only minutes earlier, and the trail was not yet cold.
Either way, the Court concluded that, in the exigent circumstances of the
case, in which there was probable cause to believe the perpetrator or evidence of his crime would be found within the home, warrantless entry
was permissible under the Fourth Amendment.54
2. Schmerber v. California and Cupp v. Murphy Introduce the
Likelihood of Destruction of Evidence as an Exigency Warranting
Eschewal of the Warrant Requirement
In 1966, the Supreme Court in Schmerber v. California55 introduced
a specific exigent circumstance that could justify a search without a warrant: the risk that evidence will be destroyed if the officer takes the time
to get a warrant. In Schmerber, Armando Schmerber had been driving
while intoxicated and got into an accident.56 The officer who responded to
the accident noted that Schmerber displayed signs of intoxication and
noted those signs again when he visited Schmerber at the hospital shortly
thereafter.57 Based on his observations, the officer arrested Schmerber
and, over his objections, ordered a physician to draw and test a sample of

50. Id. at 298–99.
51. Id. at 297.
52. See id. at 299. In this respect, this case might be better placed in the category
of emergency-aid cases, where officers enter based on an objectively reasonable belief
that someone inside the home is in immediate need of medical or other assistance. See
infra Part III.B. The Supreme Court’s analysis suggests that it was the danger of an
armed robber in the house that justified the initial entry.
53. See United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42–43 & n.3 (1976) (citing Warden
v. Hayden and implying that it was the source of the “hot-pursuit” doctrine, but appearing to disclaim the notion that Warden involved hot pursuit). For more on the
“hot-pursuit” exigency see infra Part III.A.3.
54. Warden, 387 U.S. at 298–99.
55. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
56. Id. at 758.
57. Id. at 758–59; id. at 768–69 (“The police officer who arrived at the scene
shortly after the accident smelled liquor on petitioner’s breath, and testified that petitioner’s eyes were ‘bloodshot, watery, sort of a glassy appearance.’ ”).
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Schmerber’s blood.58 The chemical analysis showed that Schmerber had
been intoxicated at the time of the accident.59
Schmerber was charged in a California municipal court and eventually convicted.60 He sought to have the evidence of his blood-alcohol concentration suppressed under numerous theories. One theory was that the
drawing of blood was a seizure under the Fourth Amendment that could
only be constitutionally executed pursuant to a warrant.61 This theory
failed at all levels, including the Supreme Court.62
The Supreme Court first concluded that the officer had probable
cause to believe Schmerber was guilty and that his blood would contain
sufficient alcohol to establish that he had been driving while intoxicated.63
Then, the Court analyzed whether the officer was entitled to rely on his
own probable cause determination or was required to seek a warrant.64
Because an officer reasonably would be aware that the alcohol in
Schmerber’s blood was dissipating, and might be gone before a warrant
could be obtained, the Court found that the officer was not required to
get a warrant.65 It stated:
The officer in the present case . . . might reasonably have believed that he was confronted with an emergency, in which the
delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances,
threatened the destruction of evidence . . . . We are told that the
percentage of alcohol in the blood begins to diminish shortly after
drinking stops, as the body functions to eliminate it from the system. Particularly in a case such as this, where time had to be taken
to bring the accused to a hospital and to investigate the scene of
the accident, there was no time to seek out a magistrate and secure a warrant. Given these special facts, we conclude that the

58. Id. at 759.
59. Id. (“The chemical analysis of this sample revealed a percent by weight of
alcohol in his blood at the time of the offense which indicated intoxication . . . .”).
60. Id. at 758.
61. Id. at 759, 766.
62. Id. at 759 (“[Petitioner] contended that . . . [admitting the evidence violated] the Fourth Amendment. The Appellate Department of the California Superior
Court rejected these contentions and affirmed the conviction . . . . [W]e granted certiorari. We affirm.”).
63. Id. at 768 (“Here, there was plainly probable cause for the officer to arrest
petitioner and charge him with driving an automobile while under the influence of
intoxicating liquor.”).
64. Id. at 769–70.
65. Id. at 772.
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attempt to secure evidence of blood-alcohol content in this case
was an appropriate incident to petitioner’s arrest.66

This type of exigent circumstance appeared again in the 1973 case of
Cupp v. Murphy.67 In Cupp, police in Portland, Oregon, were investigating a strangulation murder.68 The victim was found in her home with
abrasions and lacerations on her throat, but there were no signs of a
break-in or a robbery.69 The victim’s husband, Daniel Murphy, voluntarily
came to the police station when he heard that his wife had been killed.70
An officer noticed a dark spot under one of Mr. Murphy’s fingernails,
which the officer believed might be dried blood.71 Under protest and
without a warrant, officers took a sample of the material under Mr. Murphy’s fingernails, which turned out to contain traces of skin, blood cells,
and fabric from the victim’s nightgown.72
Mr. Murphy challenged the evidence as being obtained in violation
of the Fourth Amendment.73 The trial court, the Oregon Court of Appeals, and the federal district court on habeas review all agreed that the
search was permissible because the officers had probable cause to arrest
Mr. Murphy at the time that they took the scrapings from under his fingernails.74 The Ninth Circuit, reversed, assuming the officers had probable
cause to arrest Mr. Murphy, but finding there were no exigent circumstances to justify the officers’ failure to obtain a warrant before taking a
sample of the material under Mr. Murphy’s fingernails.75
The Supreme Court reviewed the information available to the officers and concluded that there was probable cause to arrest Mr. Murphy
when they took the sample.76 It also concluded that there was an exigency.77 The Court looked to the principles underlying its then-recent decision in Chimel v. California,78 a case in which the Court authorized a

66. Id. at 770–71 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
67. 412 U.S. 291 (1973).
68. Id. at 292.
69. Id.
70. Id. At that time, Mr. Murphy and his wife, the victim, were separated. See id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 293.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 294, 296.
77. See id. at 296. Before it made that conclusion, however, it found that Mr.
Murphy had been seized for Fourth Amendment purposes, and that such seizure was
constitutional because it was based on probable cause to believe Mr. Murphy had
committed the murder that the officers were investigating. See id. at 293–95.
78. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
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search incident to an arrest on the theory that the arrestee might have a
weapon or destructible evidence nearby.79 The Court found that Mr. Murphy’s awareness that the officers were curious about what was under his
fingernails, coupled with what appeared to be attempts to clean under his
fingernails when officers began asking questions, created an exigency that
justified the warrantless search.80 It held: “[C]onsidering the existence of
probable cause, the very limited intrusion undertaken incident to the station house detention, and the ready destructibility of the evidence, we
cannot say that this search violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.”81 In short, the Court in Schmerber v. California and Cupp v. Murphy established that the risk that evidence will be destroyed during the
time taken obtaining a search warrant is an exigent circumstance that can
justify a warrantless search.82
79. Cupp, 412 U.S. at 295 (citing Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762–63).
80. Id. at 296. See also id. at 298 (Marshall, J., concurring) (“[W]hen [the officer]
brought to Murphy’s attention his interest in taking [fingernail] scrapings . . . there
was no way to preserve the status quo while a warrant was sought, and there was good
reason to believe that Murphy might attempt to alter the status quo unless he were
prevented from doing so.”).
81. Id. at 296.
82. This principle was arguably set forth earlier, in Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23
(1963). See, e.g., Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (“We have held, for
example, that law enforcement officers may make a warrantless entry onto private
property . . . to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence, Ker v. California . . . .”); United States v. Francis, 327 F.3d 729, 735 (8th Cir. 2003) (“Although the
exigent-circumstances exception is narrowly drawn, it does justify immediate police
action without a warrant under limited circumstances, such as where . . . evidence is
about to be destroyed.”) (citing Ker, 374 U.S. at 42, among several cases). In Ker,
however, the issues appear to be somewhat conflated. Rather than determining if
exigent circumstances justified the search, the Supreme Court appeared to be analyzing whether exigent circumstances justified a warrantless entry to arrest the Kers. See
Ker, 374 U.S. at 34 (“The evidence at issue, in order to be admissible, must be the
product of a search incident to a lawful arrest, since the officers had no search warrant.”). Then, once it concluded that the arrest was justified, it analyzed whether the
search of the Kers’ apartment was permissible as a search incident to an arrest. Id. at
35–37, 38. The exigent circumstances analysis was thus oriented toward entry for the
purposes of arrest and not for the purposes of a search. Id. at 37–38. Indeed, most
cases have construed Ker as setting forth a standard under which police may enter a
home without first knocking and announcing their presence. See, e.g., Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 934 n.3 (1995) (describing Ker as “reasoning that an unannounced entry was reasonable under the ‘exigent circumstances’ of that case”)
(emphasis added); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 437 (1976) (citing Ker as an
example of when the Supreme Court has “considered whether arrests were made in
conformity with the Fourth Amendment”). One way or another, it is now accepted
that a risk that tangible evidence might be destroyed during the time it takes officers
to obtain a warrant is an exigency justifying warrantless entry. See Brigham City, 547
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3. United States v. Santana Introduces the Hot-Pursuit Exigency
In United States v. Santana,83 the Supreme Court more definitively
introduced the hot-pursuit exigency that it alluded to in Warden v. Hayden.84 In Santana, Gilletti, an undercover officer, arranged a drug buy
with a woman named McCafferty.85 Ms. McCafferty told Officer Gilletti
that the drugs would cost him $115 and that they would get them from
“Mom Santana.”86 Officer Gilletti gave some marked bills to Ms. McCafferty, who went inside Ms. Santana’s house and made the buy.87 Officer
Gilletti then arrested Ms. McCafferty, who told him that Ms. Santana had
the marked money.88 Several officers then went to Ms. Santana’s house,
where they saw Ms. Santana standing in the doorway to the house with a
brown paper bag in her hand.89 The officers got out of the police van and
shouted “police.”90 As officers approached Ms. Santana, she retreated
into the vestibule of her home; officers followed her, crossed the house’s
threshold into the vestibule, and caught her.91 When they did so, Ms.

U.S. at 403 (“We have held . . . that law enforcement officers may make a warrantless entry onto private property . . . to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence . . . .”); Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 117 n.6 (2006) (“[A] fairly
perceived need to act on the spot to preserve evidence may justify entry and search
under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement[.]”). But see
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394 (1978) (noting that exigent circumstances do not
justify a search where a police guard at the door could prevent loss of evidence);
United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51–52 (1951) (holding that officers search of a
hotel room was not justified by exigent circumstances because there “was no question
of violence, no movable vehicle was involved, nor was there an arrest or imminent
destruction, removal, or concealment of the property intended to be seized. In
fact . . . they could have easily prevented any such destruction or removal by merely
guarding the door.”).
83. 427 U.S. 38 (1976). The Supreme Court in Santana credits the decision of
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948), as being the source of the phrase “hot
pursuit,” see Santana, 427 U.S. at 43 n.3, even though the Court in Johnson found the
officers were not in hot pursuit of the defendant in that case. See Johnson, 333 U.S. at
16 n.7.
84. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring)
(“Searches may be made incident to a lawful arrest, and—as today’s decision indicates—in the course of ‘hot pursuit.’ ”).
85. Santana, 427 U.S. at 39.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 39–40.
88. Id. at 40.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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Santana dropped some paper packets filled with a white powder that the
officers later determined to be heroin.92
In her criminal case for possession with intent to distribute, Ms.
Santana moved to suppress the heroin and money found during and after
her arrest.93 Her theory was that, when the officers crossed the threshold
and entered her house without a warrant, they had violated the Fourth
Amendment.94 The federal district court granted the suppression motion
based on an obscure definition of “hot pursuit” and the Court of Appeals
affirmed.95 The Supreme Court determined first that the officers had
probable cause to arrest Ms. Santana, and concluded that Ms. Santana’s
“act of retreating into her house could [not] thwart an otherwise proper
arrest.”96 The Court found that the officers were in “hot pursuit” of Ms.
Santana when she retreated into her home and thus the entry was lawful.97 It also bolstered the conclusion that entry was permissible by expressing the concern that, because Ms. Santana was now aware that
police were seeking to apprehend her, “there was . . . a realistic expectation that any delay would result in destruction of evidence.”98 In sum, the
officers’ entry into Ms. Santana’s vestibule did not violate the Fourth
Amendment.99 The Court thus established hot pursuit as another exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.
4. When Police Are Investigating a Crime, the Exigent
Circumstances Exception Requires Probable Cause
One consistency through almost all of the exigent circumstances
cases—other than the emergency-aid cases that will be discussed below—
is that an exigency, without more, is insufficient to justify warrantless entry into a home. Rather, an officer generally must have probable cause to
believe that a crime is being committed or that evidence of a crime will be
found inside, combined with exigent circumstances, to justify a warrantless search.100 This arrangement makes sense when one considers that the
92. Id. at 40–41.
93. Id. at 41.
94. See id. at 40–41.
95. See id. (noting that the district court construed “hot pursuit” to mean “a
chase in and about the public streets”).
96. Id. at 42.
97. Id. at 42–43.
98. Id. at 43.
99. Id. (“We thus conclude that a suspect may not defeat an arrest which has
been set in motion in a public place . . . by the expedient of escaping to a private
place.”).
100. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 256 F.3d 895, 905 (9th Cir. 2001) (en
banc) (“The exigent circumstance does not, however, relieve the police of the need to
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touchstone of law enforcement searches and seizures is probable cause.
Without probable cause, the individual’s right to be free from unwarranted police intrusion into his or her life outweighs the government’s
interest in pursuing a criminal investigation. Thus, when a police officer is
executing a search or seizure for an investigative law enforcement purpose, it must be done pursuant to probable cause.
In other words, the exigent circumstances exception is an exception
only to the warrant requirement and not to the Fourth Amendment as a
whole. When police act in their criminal investigator capacity, they ordinarily must have probable cause and a warrant to lawfully enter a person’s home. The warrant requirement can be forsaken when the
exigencies of the situation demand it, but probable cause cannot be so
easily dismissed. When the police engage in criminal investigation, it cannot be dismissed at all.
B. The Emergency-Aid Exception to the Warrant and Probable Cause
Requirements
There is only one situation in which the Supreme Court has sanctioned entry into a person’s home by law enforcement officers without a
warrant or probable cause: when the officers have an objectively reasonable basis to believe they must enter the house to avoid immediate harm to
themselves or others.101 In short, when the officer is acting as a rescuer,
i.e., entering a home to avert imminent harm or to render emergency aid,
the officer need not have a warrant or probable cause.
It makes sense that probable cause is not required in an emergencyaid situation because the Supreme Court has given probable cause a very
specific definition.102 It includes both a quantum of proof (enough to warrant a man of reasonable caution in believing the fact) and a specific underlying fact—that an offense has been or is being committed, or that

have probable cause for the search.”); see also supra note 36 (citing cases that specify
that both probable cause and exigent circumstances are necessary to justify entry).
101. See Michigan v. Fisher, 130 S. Ct. 546, 548 (2009) (“[L]aw enforcement officers may enter a home without a warrant to render emergency assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent injury.”); Brigham City v.
Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (“[L]aw enforcement officers may enter a home without a warrant to render emergency assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an
occupant from imminent injury.”); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978) (“Numerous state and federal cases have recognized that the Fourth Amendment does not
bar police officers from making warrantless entries and searches when they reasonably believe that a person within is in need of immediate aid.”).
102. See supra note 10; infra notes 225–227 and accompanying text.

R

R
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evidence of a crime will be found.103 In other words, the term probable
cause is only applicable in the criminal investigation context. When an
officer is playing the role of a rescuer or a public protector, probable
cause is an inappropriate term to use. After all, there is no guarantee that
there will be criminal activity afoot or evidence of a crime in the area
when a citizen needs emergency assistance.
1. Mincey v. Arizona Creates the Emergency-Aid Exception to the
Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Requirement
The Supreme Court recognized the emergency-aid exception—and
its highly circumscribed nature—in Mincey v. Arizona.104 In Mincey, Officer Headricks, an undercover police officer, was setting up a sting operation at Mr. Mincey’s apartment.105 Officer Headricks had arranged to
buy some heroin from Mr. Mincey and showed up at the buy with nine
plainclothes police officers in tow.106 When someone opened the door to
Mr. Mincey’s apartment and saw the veritable army standing outside,
they quickly tried to shut the door, but not before Officer Headricks
managed to slip inside the apartment.107 As the officers forced their way
into the apartment, Officer Headricks and Mr. Mincey engaged in a brief
shootout in Mr. Mincey’s bedroom.108 Several individuals were wounded
and in need of aid, and the officers called for emergency assistance.109
Officer Headricks died shortly after the incident.110
The officers who entered Mr. Mincey’s apartment performed a cursory sweep of the apartment for anyone who might have been injured by
a stray bullet, but, based on Tucson Police Department protocols, they
refrained from further investigation.111 Homicide detectives, on the other
hand, arrived to investigate within ten minutes and conducted a thorough

103. See Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2639 (2009)
(“Probable cause exists where ‘the facts and circumstances within [an officer’s] knowledge and of which [he] had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in
themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that’ an offense has
been or is being committed, and that evidence bearing on that offense will be found in
the place to be searched . . . .”) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160,
175–76 (1949)) (internal citation omitted).
104. 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
105. Id. at 387.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 388.
110. Id. at 387.
111. Id. at 388.
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four-day search, which even included pulling up sections of the carpet.112
The search yielded substantial quantities of evidence, much of which was
introduced against Mr. Mincey at his trial for Officer Headricks’ murder.113 No officer ever obtained a search warrant.114
Mr. Mincey sought to have the evidence suppressed as fruit of an
unlawful search.115 At all levels, the Arizona state courts found that the
entry was authorized and that the four-day search was permissible, relying primarily on a special rule permitting a warrantless search of the
scene of a homicide.116 The U.S. Supreme Court rejected such an exception to the warrant requirement, and all of the other bases that the State
advanced to show that the search was lawful.117 The Supreme Court
stated, however, that it did “not question the right of the police to respond to emergency situations. Numerous state and federal cases have
recognized that the Fourth Amendment does not bar police officers from
making warrantless entries and searches when they reasonably believe
that a person within is in need of immediate aid.”118 Moreover, “the police may seize any evidence that is in plain view during the course of their
legitimate emergency activities.”119 Notwithstanding the existence of such
exceptions to the warrant requirement, the Court found that the exigencies of investigating a crime scene, after the individuals involved had been
arrested and the scene secured, did not justify an extensive four-day
search of the apartment without a warrant.120 In other words, the Court

112. Id. at 388–89.
113. Id. at 389.
114. Id.
115. See id. For a brief description of the exclusionary rule, under which evidence
obtained as a result of a constitutional violation cannot be used against the victim of
the violation, see supra note 39.
116. Mincey, 437 U.S. at 389–90 (quoting the Arizona Supreme Court’s holding,
that “a reasonable, warrantless search of the scene of a homicide—or of a serious
personal injury with likelihood of death where there is reason to suspect foul play—
does not violate the Fourth Amendment . . . where the law enforcement officers
were legally on the premises in the first instance”).
117. Id. at 390–91.
118. Id. at 392; see also id. (“The need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious
injury is justification for what would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or emergency.”) (quoting Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 212 (D.C. Cir. 1963)).
119. Id. at 393. “Plain view” is a term of art in the Fourth Amendment context.
“Under [the plain-view] doctrine, if police are lawfully in a position from which they
view an object, if its incriminating character is immediately apparent, and if the officers have a lawful right of access to the object, they may seize it without a warrant.”
Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 (1993).
120. Mincey, 437 U.S. at 394–96.

R
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noted the existence of an emergency-aid exception, but concluded that it
should not be applied under the facts of Mincey.
2. Brigham City v. Stuart Applies the Rule in Mincey v. Arizona
Almost thirty years later, in Brigham City v. Stuart,121 the Supreme
Court gave us an example of appropriate application of the emergencyaid exception. In this case, officers observed an altercation breaking out
through a closed screen door.122 The officers saw four adults attempting to
restrain a juvenile.123 When the juvenile broke free, he punched one of
the adults in the face, who then spit blood into a nearby sink.124 One officer opened the screen door and announced his presence.125 The officer
stepped inside the house and more loudly announced his presence when
nobody appeared to notice him the first time.126 At that time the altercation slowed and eventually ceased.127 The Court held that, “regardless of
the individual officer’s state of mind . . . [t]he officers’ entry here was
plainly reasonable under the circumstances,” because “the officers had an
objectively reasonable basis for believing both that the injured adult
might need help and that the violence in the kitchen was just beginning.”128 Furthermore, the officers’ “manner of . . . entry was . . . reasonable.”129 In making this determination, the Court considered the officers’
primary motivation, which was a desire to save lives and property.130 The
Court also determined the officers’ manner of entry was reasonable because they announced their presence through the screen door, which the
Court found equivalent to knocking to alert the occupants of their presence.131 The Court felt that under these circumstances the application of
the emergency-aid exception was appropriate.132

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

547 U.S. 398 (2006).
Id. at 400.
Id. at 401.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 404, 406.
Id. at 406.
Id. at 404.
Id. at 406–407.
Id. at 401–402 (referring to “the so-called ‘emergency aid doctrine’ ”).
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3. Michigan v. Fisher (It’s Like Brigham City Without a Visible
Victim)
The Supreme Court’s most recent exposition on the emergency-aid
exception is Michigan v. Fisher.133 In Michigan v. Fisher, officers responded to a house at which a man was reportedly “going crazy.”134 When
the officers arrived at the house they found “considerable chaos.”135 A
pickup truck with its front end smashed and blood on the hood was in the
driveway, fence-posts along the side of the property were damaged, three
of the house’s windows were broken, glass from the windows was still on
the ground, and there was blood on one of the doors to the house.136 Even
more urgent was the fact that, through a window, the officers could see
Mr. Fisher inside, “screaming and throwing things.”137 When an officer
attempted to force his way in through the front door, Mr. Fisher aimed a
gun at him, at which point the officer retreated.138
Mr. Fisher was eventually arrested, and was charged under Michigan
law with assault with a dangerous weapon and possession of a firearm
during the commission of a felony.139 He sought to suppress the evidence
against him as fruit of the officers’ entry into his home, which he contended was a Fourth Amendment violation.140 The Michigan trial court
agreed, finding the officers’ entry into Mr. Fisher’s home unlawful, and
suppressed the evidence against Mr. Fisher; the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed.141
Ultimately, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed. Citing to Mincey v. Arizona and Brigham City v. Stuart, the Court reminded
the lower courts that some emergency situations are exigent circumstances that can constitute exceptions to the usual warrant and probable
cause requirements.142 The exception at issue under these facts, the Court
found, was what it referred to as the “emergency aid exception.”143 As the
Court explained, that exception provides that, where there exists a need
133. 130 S. Ct. 546 (2009) (per curiam).
134. Id. at 547.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See id. at 547–48.
141. Id. at 548. The Michigan Supreme Court, after hearing oral argument, dismissed the appeal. Id.
142. See id.
143. Id. Again, the phrase “emergency aid exception” was mentioned in Brigham
City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 401–402 (2006), but it was not clear until Michigan v.
Fisher that the Supreme Court adopted the expression. See Fisher, 130 S. Ct. at 548
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to assist persons who are seriously injured or imminently threatened with
such injury, law enforcement officers may enter a home without a warrant
to render emergency assistance to those persons.144 The Court stated that,
for the exception to apply and for police entry to be lawful, the officer
need have “only an objectively reasonable basis for believing that a person within the house is in need of immediate aid.”145 The Court found the
officers’ entry to be lawful under “[a] straightforward application of the
emergency aid exception”:
[T]he police officers here were responding to a report of a disturbance. . . . [W]hen they arrived on the scene they encountered a
tumultuous situation in the house—and . . . they also found signs
of a recent injury, perhaps from a car accident, outside. . . . [T]he
officers could see violent behavior inside. Although Officer
Goolsby and his partner did not see punches thrown . . . they did
see Fisher screaming and throwing things. It would be objectively
reasonable to believe that Fisher’s projectiles might have a human
target (perhaps a spouse or a child), or that Fisher would hurt
himself in the course of his rage. In short, we find it as plain here
as we did in Brigham City that the officer’s entry was reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment.146

Such a series of circumstances, we now know, can create an objectively
reasonable basis for believing someone inside the house is in need of immediate aid.147

(“This ‘emergency aid exception’ does not depend on the officers’ subjective intent or
the seriousness of any crime they are investigating when the emergency arises.”).
144. See id. (citing Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403–405).
145. Id. (internal quotations, citations, and alterations omitted).
146. Id. at 548–49. Clearly the facts of Fisher are very similar to those of Brigham
City. The most noteworthy distinction appears to be that the officers in Fisher could
not confirm whether Mr. Fisher’s rage and thrown objects were directed at someone
in the house.
147. The opinion only garnered seven of the Justices’s votes. See id. at 549. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens wrote a dissent, in which Justice Sotomayor
joined. Id. The dissent, however, did not challenge the legal principles set forth in the
opinion. Id. at 550–51. Rather, they criticized the majority for second-guessing the
Michigan courts’ decision on a fact-intensive question like whether the totality of the
circumstances provided officers an objectively reasonable basis to conclude someone
inside the home was in immediate need of assistance. Id. (“Today, without having
heard Officer Goolsby’s testimony, this Court decides that the trial judge got it wrong.
I am not persuaded that he did, but even if we make that assumption, it is hard to see
how the Court is justified in micromanaging the day-to-day business of state tribunals
making fact-intensive decisions of this kind.”).
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This exception to the warrant and probable cause requirements is in
apparent recognition of the broader role of law enforcement in modern
society. Officers are
expected to reduce the opportunities for the commission of some
crimes through preventive patrol and other measures, aid individuals who are in danger of physical harm, assist those who cannot
care for themselves, resolve conflict, create and maintain a feeling
of security in the community, and provide other services on an
emergency basis.148

The decisions in Mincey v. Arizona, Brigham City v. Stuart, and
Michigan v. Fisher demonstrate the principle that in a very limited situation, officers can enter a person’s home without probable cause or a warrant. The only situation in which such entry is permissible, however, is
when the officer is acting as a rescuer or protector of a specific individual
inside the house. In Brigham City, officers observed a group of adults
trying to restrain a struggling juvenile, and saw the juvenile break free
and punch one of the adults.149 At that point, the officers had an objectively reasonable basis to believe they needed to intervene in the situation they were observing; otherwise, someone might be seriously injured.
In Michigan v. Fisher, the officers saw a man inside screaming and throwing things, but they could not see at what or whom he was screaming and

148. 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 6.6 (4th ed. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting ABA
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 1-2.2 (2d ed. 1980)). The United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has put it in these terms:
But a warrant is not required to break down a door to enter a burning home
to rescue occupants or extinguish a fire, to prevent a shooting or to bring
emergency aid to an injured person. The need to protect or preserve life or
avoid serious injury is justification for what would be otherwise illegal absent
an exigency or emergency. Fires or dead bodies are reported to police by
cranks where no fires or bodies are to be found. Acting in response to reports
of ‘dead bodies,’ the police may find the ‘bodies’ to be common drunks,
diabetics in shock, or distressed cardiac patients. But the business of policemen and firemen is to act, not to speculate or meditate on whether the report
is correct. People could well die in emergencies if police tried to act with the
calm deliberation associated with the judicial process. Even the apparently
dead often are saved by swift police response. A myriad of circumstances
could fall within the terms ‘exigent circumstances’ referred to in Miller v.
United States, supra, e.g., smoke coming out a window or under a door, the
sound of gunfire in a house, threats from the inside to shoot through the door
at police, reasonable grounds to believe an injured or seriously ill person is
being held within.

Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 212 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
149. See Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 400–401 (2006).
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throwing.150 The Supreme Court found it reasonable for the officers to
believe that someone who was screaming and throwing things had a target, and likely a human one.151 Therefore, the Court found that the officers had an objectively reasonable basis to believe they needed to
intervene to protect and render aid to a specific person inside the
home.152
C. The Tenth Circuit Recognizes the Emergency-Aid Exception
The Tenth Circuit also has recognized this subset of exigent circumstances cases that do not require probable cause, i.e., emergency-aid
cases.153 In United States v. Najar, the court held that the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement authorized a warrantless
police entry in an emergency-aid situation without a showing of probable
cause.154 The following year, the court again expressed the general rule
that an officer needs exigent circumstances plus probable cause to make a
warrantless entry into a private home, unless the exigent circumstance is
the need for emergency aid.155 In Najar, however, the Tenth Circuit set
forth its two-part test for determining whether the emergency-aid doctrine applies: “[O]ur test is now two-fold, whether (1) the officers have an
objectively reasonable basis to believe that there is an immediate need to
protect the lives or safety of themselves or others, and (2) the manner
150. See Fisher, 130 S. Ct. at 547.
151. Id. at 549.
152. Id. This conclusion is convincing. One should not wholly ignore that, as it
turned out, Mr. Fisher was yelling and throwing things at nobody. It would be a
strange rule, however, that required officers, when they observe half of what appears
to be a violent argument, to confirm that the apparent assailant is yelling at another
person. Yelling, just like speaking, is generally a form of communication and is most
often engaged in with another human as its subject. In other words, talking to oneself,
talking to imaginary persons, and talking to inanimate objects are the rare cases, not
the norm. It would be odd to force officers to rule out all unlikely explanations for
such conduct before they act. This is especially true in a situation, like that in Michigan v. Fisher, where it appeared that intervention could protect someone from serious
injury or allow the officers to render aid to the victim if injury had already been
inflicted. The Supreme Court was thus correct to liken Michigan v. Fisher to Brigham
City v. Stuart, even though the officers in Michigan v. Fisher could not see at what or
whom Mr. Fisher was yelling and throwing things. That Mr. Fisher was yelling at nobody, rather than at somebody, does not make the officers’ actions notably less
reasonable.
153. See United States v. Najar, 451 F.3d 710, 719 (10th Cir. 2006).
154. Najar, 451 F.3d at 718–20.
155. West v. Keef, 479 F.3d 757, 759 (10th Cir. 2007) (“Thus the sole question in
this case is, viewing the record testimony without the affidavit, whether the officers
had both probable cause and exigent circumstances justifying not only their warrantless entry but also their seizure.”) (emphasis added).
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and scope of the search is reasonable.”156 The Tenth Circuit has since applied that test in emergency-aid cases.
1. Most Tenth Circuit Cases Find the Emergency-Aid Exception
Applicable
The Najar case provided an example of this rule in action. At about
2:00 a.m., a 911 dispatcher received a hang-up 911 call.157 The dispatcher
tried to call back several times, but, while the call went through each
time, the person who picked up did not say anything and immediately
hung-up.158 The dispatcher sent officers to the address, who knocked on
the door and called out to anyone inside; nobody answered.159 One of the
officers, however, could see that someone was inside.160 The person would
walk to the door and look outside, but would not answer.161 The officers
eventually convinced that person—Richard Najar—to open the door.162

156.
Najar, 451 F.3d at 718. Before Najar, the rule included a third element: “the
search is not motivated by an intent to arrest and seize evidence.” Cortez v. McCauley, 478 F.3d 1108, 1124 n.21 (10th Cir. 2007). In light of the Supreme Court’s
decision in Brigham City v. Stuart, which explicitly rejected any reliance on the police
officers’ subjective intent when analyzing the emergency aid exception, the Tenth Circuit in Najar removed that third element. See id.
157. 451 F.3d at 712.
158. Id. The first hang-up 911 call, combined with these hang-ups in response to
the dispatcher’s attempts to reach the caller, probably suggested to the officers that
someone had intercepted the first 911 call and did not want whoever was in the house
to speak with the dispatcher. See id. at 720 (“[D]ispatch had been unable to make
contact with any occupant. Even more alarming, someone was answering the phone
but immediately placing it back on the receiver . . . . A reasonable person could well
be concerned that someone was trying to prevent communication with safety officials . . . .”). There are, however, other plausible explanations, such as prank calls, or
an accidental misdial and an embarrassed caller who would prefer not to talk to the
dispatcher).
159. Id. at 712.
160. Id.
161. Id. This observation likely heightened the officers’ suspicion that the person
inside was keeping a second person from calling 911. If the person inside had just
assaulted, or was in the process of assaulting, another person, he would be unlikely to
answer the door for the police officers. On the other hand, the person’s behavior is
also consistent with that of an embarrassed 911-caller, who called either as a prank or
by mistake, and did not want to face the police. But see id. at 720 n.8 (“The officers
testified it is not uncommon for a 911 call to be made by mistake. However, both
[officers] testified the common response in such situations is the occupant answering
the door, providing an explanation and . . . allowing the officers to enter in order to
assure the occupants’ safety.”).
162. See id. at 712.
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He denied calling 911 and said he was alone in the house.163 Concerned
that Najar was lying and trying to conceal someone inside the home who
needed their assistance, the officers entered over Najar’s objection.164
While inside, the officers found a woman on the bedroom floor and a
shotgun leaning against the wall.165 In Najar’s criminal prosecution for being a felon in possession of a firearm, the district court denied his motion
to suppress the gun, finding that the officers’ entry into his home was
proper.166 The Tenth Circuit affirmed, finding that the officers had the
necessary reasonable basis to believe someone inside needed their help,
and that they executed a search that was reasonable in manner and
scope.167
The Tenth Circuit has used the exception several times since its decision in United States v. Najar, though only in situations in which officers
enter due to concern for the safety and welfare of someone inside the
home. In West v. Keef, the Tenth Circuit found the exception authorized
warrantless entry when police were responding to a 911 call in which a
twelve-year-old boy reported that his mother was “going crazy,” was “trying to kill herself,” and “trying to cut her[self] with a knife.”168 In United

163. Id. Again, Najar’s denial could support either of the scenarios discussed in
the prior footnotes. If his victim called 911, he could honestly say that he did not call
but falsely deny that anyone was inside. If he called 911 as a prank or on accident, he
might falsely deny calling, to avoid facing the embarrassment and potential punishment of admitting it to police officers, but honestly say that he is alone in the house.
The existence of these other scenarios, based on facts known to the officers, suggest
that an officer can form an objectively reasonable belief when the facts upon which he
relies are ambiguous and could suggest more than one plausible scenario. This suggests that, at least in the Tenth Circuit, the objectively reasonable basis standard is
lower than a preponderance standard.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 717.
166. Id. The district court initially held that the evidence should be suppressed
because the officers needed probable cause and exigent circumstances to enter
Najar’s house, and they lacked probable cause. See United States v. Najar, No. CR 030735 JB, 2004 WL 3426122, at *4–8 (D.N.M. July 6, 2004) (Browning, J.). But, upon a
motion for reconsideration by the prosecution, the district judge applied an emergency-aid variant of the exigent circumstances exception and denied the defendant’s
motion to suppress. See United States v. Najar, No. CR 03-0735 JB, 2004 WL 3426123,
at *7–8 (D.N.M. Sept. 3, 2004) (Browning, J.). The rule that the district court fashioned, based largely on Mincey v. Arizona, showed impressive foresight, given that
the Supreme Court would not decide Brigham City v. Stuart until 2006. Id. at *8.
167. Najar, 451 F.3d at 720 (internal alterations omitted).
168. 479 F.3d 757, 759–60 (10th Cir. 2007). This is a quintessential correct application of the emergency-aid exception. A concerned citizen with first-hand knowledge—in this case, the son of the potential victim—excitedly reported that someone
was in immediate danger of being harmed and requested help. See id. at 757–58. The
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States v. Layman, the court found that entry into a mobile home was authorized under the Najar exception based on the presence of strong
chemical fumes and other paraphernalia outside, which indicated that the
mobile home was a methamphetamine laboratory.169 The Tenth Circuit
held that the officers could reasonably believe someone was inside, incapacitated by the fumes, or that the lab could explode at any moment,
harming the officers or anyone inside; either belief would justify entry.170
In United States v. Walker, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district
court’s application of the Najar exception. In Walker, officers responded
to a 911 call that reported a potential gunfight brewing in the Walker
home.171 In response to the officers’ knock at the door, the occupant
shouted: “Yeah, and I got a goddamn gun.”172 The Tenth Circuit found the
Najar exception justified the officers’ entry to disarm Walker, “who could
otherwise continue to pose a danger to the officers and others.”173
In United States v. Gambino-Zavala, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the
district court’s denial of a suppression motion on the basis of the Najar
exception.174 The officers were responding to several 911 calls reporting
gunfire in a nearby apartment; when the officers knocked on GambinoZavala’s door, he answered and claimed nobody else was inside.175 Neverofficers who responded to this call were clearly acting as rescuers, and the rule is
properly applied in that context.
169. 244 Fed. Appx. 206, 209 (10th Cir. 2007).
170. Id. at 211. Layman is likely an inappropriate application of the emergencyaid exception set down in Najar. In Layman, the officers were aware of no facts suggesting that anyone was inside the mobile home, unlike in Brigham City v. Stuart and
Michigan v. Fisher. See id. at 208–209. Moreover, in Layman the officers were investigating criminal activity, and the “imminent danger” they allegedly were averting
seems rather contrived. See id. It would have been more analytically tidy to admit the
criminal-investigative motive and assert that the officers had probable cause to believe there was evidence of a crime inside the mobile home—an assertion that appears clearly true from the recited facts. See id. at 209. The government could then use
the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement on the basis that an
explosion, however unlikely, would destroy much of the potential evidence inside. At
the very least, this opinion blurs the lines between the exigent circumstances exception and the emergency-aid exception, and it is that line which this article intends to
clarify.
171. 474 F.3d 1249, 1251 (10th Cir. 2007).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1253.
174. 539 F.3d 1221, 1227 (10th Cir. 2008).
175. Id. at 1224–26 (“Based on the sequence of events here, we conclude the
officers had reasonable belief, if not probable cause, to search the apartment for injured persons.”). This case also appears to be one that would have been more appropriately analyzed under the traditional schema of requiring probable cause and an
exigency, although an officer could reasonably believe someone inside an apartment
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theless, the officers entered Gambino-Zavala’s apartment “just to check
to make sure that there was nobody else inside that was either injured or
hurt or needed assistance.”176The Tenth Circuit held that the officers’ entry into Gambino-Zavala’s apartment was valid under the Najar
exception.177
In United States v. Stotts, the Tenth Circuit again affirmed the district
court’s order denying a suppression motion based on the emergency-aid
exception in Najar.178 The officers entered Stotts’s residence based on an
emergency call that reported Stotts was a convicted felon, intoxicated,
passed out in the backyard, carrying a firearm, and had threatened people
in the house; a household member corroborated all of these facts before
the officers’ entry and arrest.179 The court found these circumstances satisfied the requirements of Najar.180
Similarly, in United States v. Porter, the Tenth Circuit justified an
officer’s warrantless entry into a home under Najar based on: (1) a 911
call, only minutes earlier, in which the caller claimed that Porter was
drunk and had pointed a gun at her; (2) the officers’ knowledge that
Porter was a person who was frequently in trouble and was potentially a
violent convicted felon; (3) when the officers were talking to Porter at the
door of his home, he kept his left hand hidden and would not show it to
the officers upon request; and (4) Porter was otherwise belligerent.181
Finally, in Harris v. Ford, decided a month before Armijo, the Tenth
Circuit found that the Najar rule applied where a man—Harris—alleged
that a self-inflicted gunshot wounded him.182 Although the purported victim was taken to the hospital before the officer arrived at his home, the
needs immediate assistance based solely on reports of gunshots coming from inside.
After all, a gun is a weapon designed to be used against another person. It is a reasonable inference that if one hears a gunshot, usually the gun is being fired by a person at
a person. Other explanations exist—for example, people sometimes practice shooting
guns or fire them in celebration—but, in the context of an apartment complex, the
strongest inference is that it is being used as it was intended: as a weapon.
176. Id. at 1225.
177. Id. at 1227.
178. 346 Fed. Appx. 356, 359 (10th Cir. 2009) (“The officers had reasonable
grounds to believe the welfare of a person on the premises presented an immediate
need to investigate and they reasonably effected the search. Consequently, the entry
and search of Stott’ [sic] backyard was lawful.”).
179. Id. at 357.
180. Id. at 359 (holding that “[t]he officers had reasonable grounds to believe the
welfare of a person on the premises presented an immediate need to investigate and
they reasonably effected the search[,] [and] [c]onsequently, the entry and search of
Stott’ [sic] backyard was lawful.”).
181. 594 F.3d 1251, 1253–54 (10th Cir. 2010).
182. No. 09-3272, 2010 WL 801743, at *1, *4 (10th Cir. Mar. 10, 2010).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NMX\41-1\NMX106.txt

Spring 2011]

unknown

LOWERING STANDARDS

Seq: 33

16-NOV-11

11:07

101

court found the officer’s entry authorized under Najar, because the officer had entered the residence looking for injured persons after observing blood on a lawn chair, on the front porch, and on the front door of the
residence.183
2. Only Two Tenth Circuit Cases Refuse to Find the Emergency-Aid
Exception Applicable184
Since Najar, there have been only two cases in which the Tenth Circuit has analyzed the emergency-aid exception and found it did not apply.185 The first such case was Cortez v. McCauley, a civil suit against the
police under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.186 In Cortez, officers received a call from a

183. Id. at *1.
184. While this article was in its final editing stages, the Tenth Circuit decided
United States v. Martinez, 643 F.3d 1292 (10th Cir. 2011), which is a third case in which
the Tenth Circuit has declined to apply the emergency-aid exception from Najar. In
Martinez, the district court suppressed evidence of drugs and child pornography
found in Mr. Martinez’s rural home because it found the officers’ entry into the home
unconstitutional. See United States v. Martinez (Martinez I), 686 F. Supp. 2d 1161
(D.N.M. 2009) (Browning, J.) (holding the officers violated the Fourth Amendment,
but denying suppression for other reasons); United States v. Martinez (Martinez II),
696 F. Supp. 2d 1216 (D.N.M. 2010) (Browning, J.) (suppressing the evidence).
Arguing before the Tenth Circuit, the United States emphasized that three factors
provided an “objectively reasonable basis to believe” someone inside Mr. Martinez’s
home was in need of immediate aid: (1) an open-line, static-only 911 call from Mr.
Martinez’s house; (2) an unlocked sliding-glass door on the rear deck of the house;
and (3) that the house was messy and had electronics boxes stacked near the door.
Martinez, 643 F.3d at 1296. The Tenth Circuit disagreed. Id. at 1297. It noted, as the
district court had, that officers in the area knew that line problems or inclement
weather could cause the static-only 911 calls; as a result, neither the static call nor the
untidiness of Mr. Martinez’s home provided the necessary reasonable basis to enter
the home. Id. The thorough and probing analysis into the reasonableness of the
officers’ belief in Martinez indicates a swing away from the court’s earlier pattern of
liberally applying the emergency-aid doctrine. See, e.g., Harris v. Ford No. 09-3272,
2010 WL 801743 (10th Cir. Mar. 10, 2010); United States v. Porter 594 F.3d 1251 (10th
Cir. 2010); United States v. Stotts, 346 Fed. Appx. 356 (10th Cir. 2009); United States
v. Gambino-Zavala, 539 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. 2008).
185. As of July 2011, there are three cases, the third being United States v. Martinez, mentioned supra note 184.
186. 478 F.3d 1108, 1114 (10th Cir. 2007). It is not immediately clear that cases
with the procedural posture of Cortez—civil suits for civil rights violations that the
government seeks to have dismissed on grounds of qualified immunity—are useful in
determining the scope of the emergency-aid exception. Id. To defeat the defense of
qualified immunity, a plaintiff must show that there was a constitutional violation of a
right that was clearly established at the time of the challenged government conduct.
See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009); Howards v. McLaughlin, 634 F.3d
1131, 1140 (10th Cir. 2011). If the court finds the defendants are not entitled to quali-

R
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nurse who reported that a patient’s two-year-old daughter complained
that her babysitter’s boyfriend had “hurt her pee pee.”187 Based solely on
that phone call, officers went to the Cortez residence at approximately
1:00 a.m. and ordered Rick Cortez to exit the house.188 Once he complied,
the officers handcuffed him and placed him in a patrol car.189 Tina Cortez,
awakened by the commotion, was about to make a telephone call when
one of the officers entered, grabbed her by the arm, and physically removed her from the house.190
The hospital examined the alleged victim and found no evidence
that the little girl had been molested, so Rick Cortez was never charged
with any crime.191 The Cortezes sued the officers and the county, alleging
that the officers violated their Fourth Amendment rights when the officers entered and searched the house and interrogated and unlawfully
arrested Tina and Rick Cortez.192 In response, the officers asserted the
defense of qualified immunity, claiming the exigencies of the situation
warranted entering and searching the home and seizing and arresting
Tina and Rick Cortez.193 The Tenth Circuit denied the defendants qualified immunity.194 In the court’s words, the defendants “failed to articulate

fied immunity, it must be because the plaintiff’s facts, construed in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, amount to a constitutional violation. In the cases discussed
in this part, the government raised its qualified-immunity defense and argued that
there was no constitutional violation because the emergency-aid exception to the warrant requirement applied. See, e.g., Lundstrom v. Romero, 616 F.3d 1108, 1115 (10th
Cir. 2010); Cortez, 478 F.3d at 1123–24. The Tenth Circuit’s rejection of that argument
is tantamount to a finding that, if the facts are as the plaintiff asserts, the emergencyaid exception does not apply and the officers’ conduct constitutes a constitutional
violation. See Cortez, 478 F.3d at 1124; Lundstrom, 616, F.3d at 1128–29.
187. Id. at 1112–13. Rick Cortez was actually Tina Cortez’s husband, not her boyfriend. Id. at 1113.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1114.
192. Id. at 1112.
193. Id. at 1123–24.
194. Id. at 1124. Concisely put, “[t]he doctrine of qualified immunity provides
that government officials performing discretionary functions are generally shielded
from liability for damages in actions under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 insofar as their conduct
does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” 15 AM. JUR. 2D Civil Rights § 111 (2011). In
other words, qualified immunity is a legal defense available to government officials in
§ 1983 actions. Once the government official invokes the qualified-immunity defense—often at the summary judgment stage—the plaintiff must show: (1) that the
official committed a constitutional violation; and (2) that the constitutional right at
issue was clearly established at the time of the violation. See Pearson v. Callahan, 129
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any specific facts that led them to believe the Plaintiffs posed a threat to
the officers or others.”195 In other words, the officers did not give the
court any factual basis for applying the emergency aid or exigent circumstances exceptions.
The holding of Cortez v. McCauley does not bode well for a defendant seeking to suppress evidence, or a plaintiff seeking to hold the government liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Combined with the plethora of
cases applying the emergency-aid exception, Cortez suggests that the government need only present facts from which one might plausibly conclude
that an emergency exists. This minimal burden for finding an “objectively
reasonable basis” to support a warrantless entry in the absence of probaS. Ct. 808, 815–23 (2009). If the plaintiff fails to show either element—or, at the summary judgment stage, fails to create a genuine factual issue as to either element—the
government official is entitled to judgment in his or her favor. See id. at 231–32 (noting that “[q]ualified immunity is applicable unless” the plaintiff can show that the
alleged facts “make out a violation of a constitutional right” and that “the right at
issue was ‘clearly established’ at the time of defendant’s alleged misconduct.”); see
also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987) (explaining that a right is
“clearly established” when “[t]he contours of the right [are] sufficiently clear that a
reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right”). And,
although the courts were once required to analyze the two prongs in a particular order, see Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001), they are no longer so constrained.
Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 818 (“On reconsidering the procedure required in Saucier, we
conclude that, while the sequence set forth there is often appropriate, it should no
longer be regarded as mandatory.”).
195. Cortez, 478 F.3d at 1124 (emphasis added). The full analysis was as follows:
The Defendants have offered nothing, beyond innuendo and speculation, to
establish objectively reasonable grounds of an emergency, i.e., an immediate
need to protect their lives or others from serious injury or threatened injury.
They have failed to articulate any specific facts that led them to believe the
Plaintiffs posed a threat to the officers or others. In fact, the record indicates
the opposite conclusion is appropriate. The record establishes that the Plaintiffs were asleep at the time the Defendants arrived at the home. The interior,
as well as exterior lights, were off. Rick Cortez answered the door wearing
only a pair of shorts. He cooperated with the officers as they voiced their
commands. No evidence in the record suggests the presence of other people
in the home. Additionally, no evidence in the record establishes actual or
threatened injury to any person or imminent violence. The only basis for the
search was the unsubstantiated allegation of the nurse regarding a child at
another location. We do not believe this evidence establishes the existence of
emergency conditions at the Cortez home. Therefore, we agree with the district court that a finding of exigency was inappropriate.

Id. It is not entirely clear why this lack of factual basis is substantially different from
other cases in which a panel of the Tenth Circuit has found the officers’ basis for
believing a person inside a dwelling needed immediate assistance. In particular, in
Layman and Najar the officers’ basis for believing someone was in imminent danger
seemed almost as speculative. See supra notes 160–163, 169–170, and accompanying
text.

R
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ble cause dramatically increases the number of situations in which such
warrantless entries will be found reasonable.
The second case in which the Tenth Circuit declined to apply the
emergency-aid exception was Lundstrom v. Romero.196 In Lundstrom, a
woman called 911 and reported that she “heard a woman at Lundstrom’s
residence ‘like beating [her] toddler, and [she’s] got him outside in the
rain and she’s screaming at him that he can come in the house when he
shuts the f*** up.”197 The woman further reported that “she actually did
not see anything but [that] she could ‘hear the sound of [the woman’s]
hand striking [the child]’ and his ‘screaming.’”198 Officer Romero arrived
at Mr. Lundstrom’s house shortly thereafter, aware of the facts that the
woman reported to 911.199
Once on the scene, Officer Romero heard a high-pitched voice, but
could not tell whether it was a child or an adult.200 When she rang the
doorbell, Mr. Lundstrom answered.201 Officer Romero told Mr. Lundstrom that she was there to check on a child’s welfare, to which Mr.
Lundstrom replied that there were no children in the house.202 Other of-

196. 616 F.3d 1108 (10th Cir. 2010). This case gives some hope that the Tenth
Circuit is not a mere rubber stamp of approval on law enforcement officers’ assertion
that the emergency-aid exception applies. Its analysis was thoughtful, and it ultimately
rejected the government’s assertion that the officers’ entry was justified under the
emergency-aid exception. Id. at 1128–29. On the other hand, the facts that the officers
were aware of at the time of the search clearly suggested that they were at the wrong
house, and indeed, the tone of the court’s opinion indicates that the judges on the
panel were annoyed with the officers’ conduct in the case. See id. at 1122–24 (repeatedly emphasizing that the officers had failed to interview a detained witness and failed
to corroborate the tip from which they were acting); id. at 1128–29 (noting facts, apparently ignored by the officers, that should have vitiated their belief that there was
an ongoing emergency). In short, notwithstanding Lundstrom, the burden on law enforcement officers to justify entry under the emergency-aid exception remains
minimal.
197. Id. at 1115 (quoting from the record).
198. Id. (quoting from the record).
199. Id. at 1115–16.
200. Id. at 1116.
201. Id.
202. Id. The facts that the Tenth Circuit recited in Lundstrom are somewhat more
colorful. For example, the Tenth Circuit notes that Officer Romero testified that Mr.
Lundstrom actually said, “there [are] no f***ing kids here” and slammed the door in
her face. Id. But, because of the posture of the case—it was a review of a district
court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the government defendants on grounds
of qualified immunity—the Tenth Circuit was required to take the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to Lundstrom. Id. at 1115, 1118. The facts recited
here are described in that light as well.
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ficers arrived on the scene shortly thereafter.203 At some point, Jane
Hibner—Mr. Lundstrom’s girlfriend and the only woman in the house—
came outside.204 Officers eventually handcuffed her and made her sit on
the curb for the duration of events.205 Before entering Mr. Lundstrom’s
home, police dispatch contacted the 911 caller who initially reported the
incident, to inform the caller that there did not appear to be a child at the
Lundstrom residence, to which the caller replied: “Well, then it’s the
wrong address, because this was an infant and a female adult.”206 Some of
the officers reached Mr. Lundstrom’s backyard and saw him pacing back
and forth in his bedroom looking upset.207 By telephone, the police dispatcher eventually convinced Mr. Lundstrom to exit his home and surrender to the officers’ custody.208 Once they had secured Mr. Lundstrom,
they entered and searched his home looking for a child, which they did
not find.209
Mr. Lundstrom and Ms. Hibner sued the Albuquerque Police Department officers involved, including Officer Romero, for civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.210 They alleged several violations, one of
which being unlawful entry into their home.211 The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of the officers on grounds of qualified immunity.212 Although the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court as to many
of the claims, it reversed on some grounds, including Mr. Lundstrom’s
and Ms. Hibner’s claim of unlawful entry.213 The Tenth Circuit noted the
lack of corroborating evidence to support the officers’ concern that someone inside the house was in need of assistance, and that “every fact
presented to [the officers] since their arrival at the home indicated that

203. Id. at 1116.
204. Id. at 1115, 1116.
205. See id. at 1116–17.
206. Id. at 1117. The Tenth Circuit construed the facts to assume that the officers
who entered Mr. Lundstrom’s home were aware of these facts and thus aware that
there was no child in the house. See id. at 1128 (“[B]oth Lundstrom and Hibner had
been handcuffed and positioned away from the house, Lundstrom had told the officers no child was at the residence, and the neighbor had indicated she might have
reported the wrong address . . . . The record does not indicate the officers encountered anything suggesting someone inside Lundstrom’s house was in immediate danger or seriously injured.”).
207. Id. at 1117.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 1118.
210. Id. at 1115, 1118.
211. Id. at 1118.
212. Id. at 1115.
213. Id. at 1129.
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there was no ongoing emergency.”214 The Tenth Circuit recited those
facts:
[T]he neighbor reported hearing a woman—not a man—disciplining a child; Lundstrom told Officer Romero there was no child at
the house; the neighbor back-tracked about her initial story and
the location of the incident; Hibner had yet to be interviewed;
some time had passed since the initial 911 call and nothing otherwise suggested criminal activity; and the officers did not perceive
anything suggesting a child’s presence at the house.215

The Tenth Circuit concluded that “[t]he officers did not have a reasonable
basis for believing Lundstrom posed an immediate threat to them, himself, Ms. Hibner, or anyone else. Nor did they have grounds to believe a
child was in the home—Lundstrom denied it and Ms. Hibner’s knowledge had been ignored to this point.”216 The Tenth Circuit thus remanded
the case to the district court.217
The conclusion to which these cases lead is that so long as the police
weave together some facts and a plausible justification for believing that
someone inside the home needed immediate assistance, the Tenth Circuit
will accept that justification as objectively reasonable. As shown above,
the Tenth Circuit rejects an emergency-aid entry only where there are no
facts to plausibly support the officers’ belief218 or where the officer is
aware of facts that undermine the belief that an emergency-aid situation
exists.219 The Supreme Court might have intended such a low standard
when it decided Brigham City v. Stuart and Michigan v. Fisher, but it is

214. Id. at 1123–24 (“We stress the lack of corroborating evidence at this point in
the encounter.”).
215. Id. at 1124.
216. Id. at 1124–25. This statement—that the officers ignored Ms. Hibner’s
knowledge—suggests that the Tenth Circuit was considering the officers’ subjective
mental state in its Fourth Amendment analysis. While the Tenth Circuit regularly says
that the officer’s subjective intent is irrelevant, considering the officer’s mental state is
almost unavoidable, as an officer’s actions cannot be analyzed without some reference
to the officer’s purpose in taking—or, in this case, not taking—those actions.
217. Id. at 1129.
218. See, e.g., Cortez v. McCauley, 478 F.3d at 1108, 1124 (10th Cir. 2007) (finding
the emergency-aid exception did not justify a warrantless and probable-cause-less entry where the officers “failed to articulate any specific facts that led them to believe
the Plaintiffs posed a threat to the officers or others.”) (emphasis added).
219. See Lundstrom, 478 F.3d at 1128–29 (finding the emergency-aid exception
did not justify entry into a house where officers had detained both known occupants,
there was no indication that anyone else was inside, and it was suggested that they
might be at the wrong house).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NMX\41-1\NMX106.txt

Spring 2011]

unknown

Seq: 39

16-NOV-11

LOWERING STANDARDS

11:07

107

intellectually dishonest to conclude that the language of those cases demands that conclusion.220
D. Except in Emergency-Aid Situations, Courts Agree that Entry Under
the Exigent Circumstances Exception Requires Probable Cause
In the context of a search or seizure in the course of a criminal investigation, an officer may constitutionally enter a person’s home only if
one of two criteria is present: (1) the officer has a search warrant supported by probable cause; or (2) the officer has probable cause and exigent circumstances.221 Moreover, what constitutes an exigency is highly
circumscribed and thus some situations that appear to be emergencies
will not justify warrantless entry.222 The criminal investigation exigencies
that have been clearly recognized, as described above, are hot pursuit or
the imminent destruction of evidence.223 It is only when the police officer
is acting in her rescuer capacity that probable cause is not necessary, and
that conclusion is based on the Supreme Court’s decision not to analyze
emergency-aid cases using the language of probable cause.224
The Supreme Court’s decision not to discuss probable cause in the
emergency-aid context makes sense. The Court defined probable cause to
mean a reasonable probability that a crime is being committed or that the

220. Indeed, this article will argue that the standard should be higher than what
the Tenth Circuit has applied.
221. See Kirk v. Louisiana, 536 U.S. 635, 638 (2002) (holding that “police officers
need either a warrant or probable cause plus exigent circumstances, in order to make
a lawful entry into a home”).
222. See, e.g., Manzanares v. Higdon, 575 F.3d at 1142–43 (10th Cir. 2009)
(“[E]ven when a felony has been committed and there is probable cause to believe
that incriminating evidence will be found within a home, police may not enter without
a warrant absent exigent circumstances.”) (citing Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 559
(2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
223. See supra Part III.A.
224. See United States v. Najar, 451 F.3d 710, 718 (noting that the Supreme Court
in Brigham City v. Stuart, which was determining “whether the risk of personal danger
created exigent circumstances,” did not “require probable cause in this type of exigent
circumstances”). The Tenth Circuit expressly referenced the distinction in standards in
an opinion decided a year after United States v. Najar.
[T]he sole question in this case is, viewing the record testimony without the
affidavit, whether the officers had both probable cause and exigent circumstances justifying not only their warrantless entry but also their seizure. The
Supreme Court has made clear, however, that police may enter a home without a warrant where they have an objectively reasonable basis for believing
that an occupant is seriously injured or imminently threatened with such
injury.

West v. Keef, 479 F.3d 757, 759 (10th Cir. 2007).
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officer will find evidence of criminality in a particular place.225 The definition has two important features. The first is the quantity of evidence or
knowledge that the officer must have, which the Court described as
enough to warrant a man of reasonable caution in believing that a certain
fact is true.226 The second is of what fact or facts the officer must have
evidence or knowledge; such facts include: (1) that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing a crime; or (2) that the place to be
searched will contain evidence of a crime.227 The term probable cause thus
implies that there is criminal activity afoot.
When the officer is acting in his rescuer capacity, the term probable
cause is a poor fit. To demand that an officer have probable cause before
entering a home to rescue a person would be to mandate that the officer
only rescue suspected criminals or those associated with suspected
criminals, otherwise the criminality element would be absent. Several situations come to mind in which a person might be injured or imperiled in
225. See, e.g., Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2639
(2009) (“Probable cause exists where ‘the facts and circumstances within [an officer’s]
knowledge and of which [he] had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient
in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that’ an offense has
been or is being committed, and that evidence bearing on that offense will be found in
the place to be searched.”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); id.
(“Perhaps the best that can be said generally about the required knowledge component of probable cause for a law enforcement officer’s evidence search is that it raise a
fair probability or a substantial chance of discovering evidence of criminal activity.”)
(internal citation and quotation marks omitted); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325,
358 (1985) Brennan, J. dissenting) (describing probable cause as knowledge “of facts
and circumstances that warrant a prudent man in believing that the offense has been
committed”) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted); Texas v. Brown, 460
U.S. 730, 741 (1983) (“[P]robable cause is a flexible, common-sense standard. It
merely requires that the facts available to the officer would ‘warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief,’ that certain items may be contraband or stolen property or
useful as evidence of a crime . . . .”) (internal citation omitted); Gerstein v. Pugh,
420 U.S. 103, 111–12 (1975) (“The standard for arrest is probable cause, defined in
terms of facts and circumstances ‘sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that
the [suspect] had committed or was committing an offense.’ ”) (quoting Beck v. Ohio,
379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964)); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 35 (1963) (“[P]robable
cause . . . exists ‘where the facts and circumstances within . . . (the officers’) knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information (are) sufficient in
themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that ’ [sic] an offense
has been or is being committed.’ ”) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160,
175–76 (1949)); United States v. Tobin, 923 F.2d 1506, 1510 (11th Cir. 1991) (en banc)
(“[P]robable cause exists ‘where the facts lead a reasonably cautious person to believe
that the search will uncover evidence of a crime.’ ”) (quoting United States v. Burgos,
720 F.2d 1520, 1525 (11th Cir.1983)).
226. See supra note 225.
227. Id.
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the home, and yet there is no obvious crime to investigate. Imagine, for
example, that a homeowner accidentally started a kitchen fire and could
not reach the door of the house. There would be no probable cause to
enter to rescue the homeowner, because there is no reason to believe the
homeowner committed a crime or that there is evidence of a crime inside
the home. Should the officers sit idly by and watch as the house burns?
No.228
Instead, the Court in Brigham City and Michigan v. Fisher discussed
the emergency-aid doctrine in terms of having an “objectively reasonable
basis to believe.”229 Of course, if the Court wanted to use the same quantum of evidence as it required for traditional probable cause, but change
the subject matter, it could have altered its definition of probable cause,
or it could have defined its objectively reasonable basis test in terms of
probable cause. It did neither, however, and courts are left to ponder as
to the correct quantum of evidence necessary to form a reasonable basis
to believe a fact. As with most Fourth Amendment doctrines, the analysis
is objective and based on the facts known to the officer at the time of the
controversial conduct; the officers’ subjective intent is irrelevant.230

228. Several cases illustrate this point. See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 624 F.3d
626 (4th Cir. 2010) (“[A] warrant is not required to break down a door to enter a
burning home to rescue occupants or extinguish a fire, to prevent a shooting or to
bring emergency aid to an injured person”) (quoting Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d
205, 212 (D.C. Cir. 1963)); Steigler v. Anderson, 496 F.2d 793, 795 (3d Cir. 1974)
(“[W]e think it is beyond question that firemen have a right to enter a premise to
suppress a fire without having to obtain a warrant . . . . Moreover, seeking out and
rescuing trapped occupants . . . involve[s] [a] proper fire fighting function[ ] which
cannot reasonably be viewed as searches under the fourth amendment.”) (emphasis
added).
229. See Michigan v. Fisher, 130 S. Ct. 546, 548 (2009); Brigham City v. Stuart,
547 U.S. 398, 406 (2006). One thing the Supreme Court did not do in Brigham City or
Michigan v. Fisher, unfortunately, is discuss the quantum of evidence necessary to
form an objectively reasonable belief. See generally Fisher, 130 S. Ct. 546; Brigham
City, 547 U.S. 398. The Court might have intended the objectively reasonable basis
test to require a lower quantum of proof, or it might merely have intended to leave
the existing definition of probable cause undisturbed. The latter rationale is more
likely. As will be discussed below, this is one of the problems with the doctrine the
Tenth Circuit set down in Armijo.
230. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989) (commenting that, for
Fourth Amendment purposes, the reasonableness of an officer’s belief must be assessed in the particular circumstances confronting the officer at the time); Brigham
City, 547 U.S. at 404 (“An action is ‘reasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment, regardless of the individual officer’s state of mind, ‘as long as the circumstances, viewed
objectively, justify [the] action.’ ”) (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138
(1978)) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted).
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IV. THE ARMIJO CASE
The Armijo case involved difficult facts. On September 22, 2006,
anonymous callers called in two bomb threats to Oñate High School in
Las Cruces, New Mexico.231 The police officers assigned to the school had
dealt with several bombing or shooting threats, as well as other unspecified “gang problems,” over the past two months.232
A. An Unknown Person Called in Bomb Threats on Oñate High School
On the morning of September 22, two female students predicted the
bomb threats to the school’s principal.233 The students stated they had
seen a fight between two rival gangs and heard a gang member threaten
that his gang would bring guns to school, call in a bomb threat, and then
open fire on students when they came outside.234 The students did not
know who the gang members were, but stated that they recognized them
from Oñate High School and assumed they were referring to that
school.235
Later, a woman who identified herself as a mother of a student attending Mayfield High School called Oñate High School’s principal.236
She reported that her son told her that a boy named Chris planned to call
in a bomb threat.237 This mother stated that she believed Chris was a
member of the East Siders gang—one of the two gangs involved in the
scuffle about which the female students told the principal earlier.238 She
also stated that Chris had previously gone to Oñate High School but re-

231. Armijo ex rel. Armijo Sanchez v. Peterson, 601 F.3d 1065, 1068 (10th Cir.
2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1473 (2011). The statement of facts in this article is very
similar to that found in the Armijo opinion because Fourth Amendment analysis is
inherently fact-intensive. The Tenth Circuit stated the facts clearly and concisely, and
this article uses similar language so as not to risk changing the reader’s understanding
of what occurred.
232. Id. While the opinion indicates that there had been several threats, there is
nothing in the opinion to indicate that there had ever been an actual bombing or
shooting at Oñate High School. See id.
233. Id.
234. Id. This rumor was apparently the only reported reference to a potential
school shooting. See id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. The officers were acting on fourth-hand information. See id. Chris’s statements were conveyed to this other student, who then conveyed them to his mother,
who conveyed them to the principal at Oñate High School, who then told the officers.
See id. This further underscores the weakness of the facts upon which the officers
entered Chris’s home.
238. Id.
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cently transferred to Mayfield.239 The principal of Oñate High School told
the police about both tips.240
At 10:35 a.m., a young-sounding male made the first bomb threat on
Oñate via a 911 call.241 The officers, believing the shooting threat to be
more dangerous than the bomb threat, had the principal keep the students inside.242 At 11:00 a.m., another juvenile-sounding male called
Oñate and made a bomb threat.243 Both calls were made from disconnected cellular telephones and were therefore too difficult to trace.244
Shortly after the second bomb threat, the officers concluded that
Christopher Armijo was the only suspect.245 Chris was considered a suspect because the officers believed that: (1) Oñate High School had recently expelled him and he now attended Mayfield High School; (2) Chris
was associated with the East Siders gang; and (3) no other student named
“Chris” had recently transferred between those schools.246 Based on that
information, the police dispatched four officers to Chris’s home.247
B. The Police Entered and Detained Chris
Approximately twenty minutes after the second bomb threat, the
officers arrived at Chris’s home, knocked on the door, loudly identified
themselves, and asked anyone inside to come to the door.248 The officers

239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. As the Tenth Circuit explained: “All cell phones can call 911, even if their
service is disconnected, but disconnected phones are harder to trace than functioning
phones.” Id.
245. Id. at 1068, 1077.
246. Id. at 1068. It turned out that not all of these facts were correct, but the
reasonableness of the officers’ actions is determined in the context of the facts that
they knew or reasonably believed at the time of the challenged actions. As the Tenth
Circuit put it:
Here, the officers had a history of gang problems, two accounts of what might
occur, and the bomb threats. Some information provided a link (albeit incorrectly) to Mr. Armijo . . . . Still, the Fourth Amendment evaluates reasonableness based upon what the officers reasonably believed at the time. It does
not matter that, in retrospect, information provided to the officers was wrong,
and that Mr. Armijo apparently had nothing to do with the threats.

See id. at 1072 (citing Michigan v. Fisher, 130 S. Ct. 546, 549 (2009)). In other words,
that the facts were incorrect is not relevant, so long as the officers’ belief in those
underlying facts was reasonable. The Tenth Circuit implicitly concluded that the officers’ beliefs were reasonable.
247. Id. at 1068.
248. Id. at 1068–69.
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called out and knocked on the door for two or three minutes.249 When
nobody answered, the officers tested the door knob and found the door
was unlocked.250 The officers radioed to a sergeant who was at the school;
the sergeant thought Chris was the only suspect and authorized the officers to enter the home.251 The officers thus entered and began to search
for Chris inside.252
The officers found Chris in his bedroom, where he was sound
asleep.253 Two of the officers brandished their guns in Chris’s face and
yelled at him to get up.254 One or more of them pulled him out of bed.255
One handcuffed him, and one took him out onto his porch, where he
stood wearing only his underwear and a t-shirt.256 After a five-minute
search of the house, and an investigation of Chris’s cellular telephone and
the house’s hard-line telephone, the officers concluded that neither telephone had called in the bomb threats.257 At that point, the officers removed Chris’s handcuffs and left.258
C. Chris’s Mother Sued the Officers and Lost
Martha Armijo, Chris’s mother, sued the police officers under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, based on what she believed was an unlawful entry and
search of her home and an unlawful detention of her son.259 In response
to the suit, the defendants moved for summary judgment on the grounds
of qualified immunity.260 The magistrate judge261 denied the motion, stating that there were material factual issues in dispute that necessitated a

249. Id. at 1069.
250. Id.
251. Id. The Tenth Circuit explained the sergeant’s apparent chain of reasoning
for believing Chris was a suspect as follows: “From her own knowledge, the sergeant
believed Oñate High School had recently expelled Mr. Armijo, that he now attended
Mayfield High School, that expelled students might be angry with the school, and that
bomb threats generally were made by angry or problematic students.” Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Armijo, 601 F.3d at 1067.
260. Id. at 1067–68, 1069.
261. The parties consented to proceed before the Honorable Robert H. Scott,
United States Magistrate Judge, who ruled on the motion for summary judgment. See
Armijo v. Las Cruces Police Officers, No. 09-0090 RHS/CEG, slip op. at 4 (D.N.M.
Apr. 9, 2009) (Scott, M.J.).
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trial.262 The defendants filed an appeal challenging the magistrate judge’s
qualified-immunity finding.263 The Honorable Mary Beck Briscoe, David
M. Ebel, and Paul J. Kelly, Jr., U.S. Circuit Judges, presided.264 The panel,
in a two-to-one decision, reversed.265
Judge Kelly’s majority opinion, in which Judge Ebel joined, began
with the presumption that searches and seizures within a home and without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.266 It then cited to Mincey
v. Arizona for the proposition that sometimes exigent circumstances allow officers to dispense with the warrant requirement, and to Brigham
City v. Stuart for the proposition that one such exigency is where the officers have an objectively reasonable belief that they must enter to assist
persons who are seriously injured or threatened with such serious injury
inside.267 To the court’s credit, it acknowledged that the Supreme Court’s
precedent had gone only so far as to allow officers to enter when an occupant is in peril.268 It also acknowledged that, “[h]ere, officers acted to protect not the house’s occupants, but the students and staff at a nearby high
school”—i.e., that the Court was stretching the emergency-aid doctrine to
a place it had not yet gone.269 Ultimately, the Court modified existing law
to hold that “the exigent circumstances exception permits warrantless
home entries when officers reasonably believe that some actor or object
in a house may immediately cause harm to persons or property not in or
near the house.”270 With that doctrine in place, the Court concluded that
“[t]he information the officers had was enough for a reasonable belief
that exigent circumstances justified entry.”271 The Tenth Circuit thus reversed, holding that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity because they had committed no constitutional violation.272

262. See id. at 3–4; see also Armijo, 601 F.3d at 1069.
263. Armijo, 601 F.3d at 1069.
264. See id. at 1067.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 1067, 1070.
267. Id. at 1070.
268. Id. at 1070–71 (“The Supreme Court illustrated that ‘police may enter a
home without a warrant when they have an objectively reasonable basis for believing
that an occupant is seriously injured or imminently threatened with such injury.’ ”)
(quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 400 (2006)).
269. Id. at 1071.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 1072.
272. Id. at 1075. The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari in this case on February 22, 2011. See Armijo v. Peterson, 131 S. Ct. 1473 (2011).
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D. Chief Judge Briscoe Dissents273
Chief Judge Briscoe dissented from the Armijo decision.274 The first
concern she expressed was that the majority exercised jurisdiction over
an interlocutory appeal of a district court’s qualified-immunity decision,
which turned on a disputed issue of material fact.275 She found that, “[b]y
asserting jurisdiction over this appeal, the majority implicitly, but erroneously, concludes, contrary to the conclusion reached by the district court,
that reasonable minds could not differ with regard to whether the facts
leading up to the officers’ entry into plaintiff’s home gave rise to exigent
circumstances.”276
In addition to the jurisdictional issue, Chief Judge Briscoe cited
three additional points on which she disagreed with the majority’s opinion.277 First, she faulted the majority for extending Brigham City v. Stuart
to what is, essentially, an investigative law enforcement entry into a citizen’s home without probable cause or a warrant.278 She underscored, as
this article does, that exigent circumstances generally must be coupled
with probable cause where the officers are engaged in law enforcement/
investigative conduct.279 Second, she asserted that the majority erred in
finding the officers’ conduct justified under the protective-sweep doctrine.280 Chief Judge Briscoe argued that such protective sweeps are only
authorized incident to a valid arrest and that the Tenth Circuit has refused to extend the protective sweep justification beyond circumstances
involving arrests.281 Third, she contended that the majority erred in con273. It appears that Chief Judge Briscoe became Chief Judge of the Tenth Circuit
in 2010, near the time that Armijo was decided. See The U.S. Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals, Chief Judge Mary Beck Briscoe, http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/chambers/
index.php?id=15 (last visited Mar. 6, 2011) (stating that Judge Briscoe “[s]erved as
chief judge, 2010-present.”). Although she is not denoted as Chief Judge in the
Armijo opinion, see Armijo, 601 F.3d at 1075 (“BRISCOE, Circuit Judge,
dissenting”), this article will refer to her as Chief Judge.
274. Armijo, 601 F.3d at 1075.
275. Id. at 1075–76.
276. Id. at 1076 (Briscoe, C.J., dissenting). Chief Judge Briscoe’s conclusion in
this regard appears correct, but this article focuses on the doctrinal underpinnings of
the majority’s new rule of law.
277. Id.
278. See id. at 1079–80.
279. See id. at 1079–82.
280. Id. at 1082. An extensive discussion of the protective-sweep doctrine is beyond the scope of this article, however, Chief Judge Briscoe provides a thorough definition of it in her dissent. See id. at 1082–83.
281. See id. at 1083. It appears to be true that the protective-sweep doctrine has
no place in the facts of Armijo, primarily because such sweeps are appropriate only
after a valid arrest. See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 333 (1990) (contrasting a
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cluding that Terry v. Ohio justified the officers’ in-home seizure of
Chris.282 She asserted that when the officers handcuffed Chris and removed him to his porch while they conducted a search of his home, they
were executing an arrest, not a Terry stop.283
V. WHAT’S WRONG WITH ARMIJO?
What is wrong with what the Tenth Circuit did? First, the Tenth Circuit created a new exception to the Fourth Amendment—one that the
Supreme Court has alluded to in the past but never applied. It held that
“the exigent circumstances exception permits warrantless home entries

protective sweep with a Terry frisk: “A Terry . . . frisk occurs before a police-citizen
confrontation has escalated to the point of arrest. A protective sweep, in contrast,
occurs as an adjunct to the serious step of taking a person into custody for the purpose of prosecuting him for a crime.”); United States v. Freeman, 479 F.3d 743, 750
(10th Cir. 2007) (“A ‘protective sweep’ is a quick and limited search of premises,
incident to an arrest and conducted to protect the safety of police officers or others.”)
(citing Buie, 494 U.S. at 327). According to the Armijo majority, Chris was never
arrested. See Armijo, 601 F.3d at 1072 (majority) (“As we discuss below, the officers
did not arrest Mr. Armijo, so the search could not have been incident to an arrest.”).
282. Id. at 1085 (Briscoe, C.J., dissenting).
283. See id. at 1083–85. A Terry stop is a brief investigatory detention that can be
executed when an officer reasonably suspects a person is involved in criminal activity.
United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment is satisfied if the officer’s action is supported by reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal
activity may be afoot (quotations marks and citations omitted)). An officer can execute a Terry stop based on less information than would be necessary to establish probable cause, but the permissible scope of the detention is also narrower. See id. at 274
(“[T]he likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for probable
cause . . . .”); Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 693 (1996) (“An investigatory
stop is permissible under the Fourth Amendment if supported by reasonable suspicion . . . .”); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 714 (1983) (“It is clear that Terry,
and the cases that followed it, permit only brief investigative stops and extremely
limited searches based on reasonable suspicion.”) (Brennan, J., concurring); Dunaway
v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 210 (1979) (describing Terry as creating a “narrowly defined less intrusive seizure on grounds less rigorous than probable cause, but only for
the purpose of a pat-down for weapons”). If the stop exceeds the permissible scope, it
is a constitutional violation unless the officer had probable cause. See Minnesota v.
Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 373 (1993) (“If the protective search goes beyond what is
necessary to determine if the suspect is armed, it is no longer valid under Terry and its
fruits will be suppressed.”); Place, 462 U.S. at 709–10 (holding that under circumstances the officers’ seizure of the defendant’s luggage was unreasonable in the absence of probable cause and exceeded “the permissible limits of a Terry-type
investigative stop”); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (“[A]n investigative
detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the
purpose of the stop.”).
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when officers reasonably believe that some actor or object in a house may
immediately cause harm to persons or property not in or near the
house.”284 While such a rule may be justified in some extreme circumstances, Armijo did not present those circumstances. Second, it perpetuated a trend of requiring minimal proof to apply this variant of the
exigent circumstances exception. Third, and most importantly, it articulated its rule in overly broad terms that could allow officers conducting
routine criminal investigations to enter individuals’ homes without probable cause. Finally, to the extent the exception correctly reflects federal
law, the court’s application of the rule is questionable.
A. The Supreme Court Has Never Allowed Entry Into a Home for the
Purpose of Averting Harm to Someone Outside
The Supreme Court has never applied the emergency-aid exception
in the way that the Tenth Circuit used it in Armijo. As described above,
the first mention of an emergency-aid exception appears to be in Mincey
v. Arizona, and the Supreme Court did not actually apply it until 2006, in
Brigham City v. Stuart, and 2009, in Michigan v. Fisher.285 Even when the
Court has applied the exception, in Brigham City and Fisher, it did so
only in the rescuer context, i.e., in the context of a police officer entering
a home to avert imminent harm to someone inside. While the Supreme
Court has stated that it might be permissible for an officer to enter a
home to avert imminent harm to someone outside the home,286 it has
never applied that rule.
The Supreme Court has opined several times how exceptions to the
warrant and probable-cause requirements should be highly circumscribed.287 Justice Scalia, in California v. Acevedo, asserted that the Fourth

284. Armijo ex rel. Armijo Sanchez v. Peterson, 601 F.3d 1065, 1071 (2010), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 1473 (2011).
285. See supra Parts III.B1–B3.
286. See Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 95 (1990) (“The Minnesota Supreme
Court applied essentially the correct standard in . . . observ[ing] that a warrantless
intrusion may be justified by . . . the risk of danger to the police or to other persons
inside or outside the dwelling.”) (quoting State v. Olson, 436 N.W.2d 92, 97 (Minn.
1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
287. See, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978) (“[S]earches conducted
outside the judicial process, without prior approval by a judge or magistrate, are per
se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”) (emphasis added) (internal quotations
marks omitted) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)); Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474 (1971) (“[A] search or seizure carried out on a
suspect’s premises without a warrant is per se unreasonable, unless the police can
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Amendment has more than enough exceptions as it is.288 The Tenth Circuit in Armijo acknowledged that it was expanding upon, rather than applying, its existing doctrine. The court stated:
We must decide whether the exigent circumstances exception only
justifies warrantless entries into a house to aid a potential victim in
the house, or if it also justifies warrantless entries into a house to
stop a person or property inside the house from immediately harming people not in or near the house.289

The Tenth Circuit thus understood it was navigating uncharted territory
when it drafted the Armijo opinion. It should have followed established
doctrine.
That is not to say that there will never exist a fact pattern in which
the rule articulated in Armijo will be appropriate. Especially now, after
the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States is on heightened
alert of terrorism. The concern remains fresh in American minds thanks
to recent attempted attacks290 and terrorism’s incorporation into popular

show that it falls within one of a carefully defined set of exceptions . . . .”) (emphasis
added).
288. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(“Even before today’s decision, the ‘warrant requirement’ had become so riddled
with exceptions that it was basically unrecognizable.”). See also United States v.
Najar, 451 F.3d 710, 714 n.1 (10th Cir. 2006) (O’Brien, J.) (noting the “plethora of
exceptions to [the] presumptive unreasonableness” associated with a warrantless
search) (quoting Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 571–73 (2004) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting)).
289. Armijo ex rel. Armijo Sanchez v. Peterson, 601 F.3d 1065, 1071 (10th Cir.
2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1473 (2011). The Tenth Circuit’s use of emphasis is interesting. It does not emphasize the word “immediately,” which is the only word emphasized in its statement of the rule of law that the case sets forth. See id. (holding “that
the exigent circumstances exception permits warrantless home entries when officers
reasonably believe that some actor or object in a house may immediately cause harm
to persons or property not in or near the house”). The Tenth Circuit’s loose definition
of “immediately” is one of the primary concerns with the Armijo holding. If the term
“immediately” is not well constrained, any tip stating that a person inside a house
might soon commit a crime that would have a victim would allow police officers to
enter that person’s house with little or no concern for the veracity of that tip.
290. See Al Baker & William K. Rashbaum, Police Find Car Bomb in Times
Square, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2010, at A1; Ken Dilanian, Britain: Jet Bomb Was Set to
Explode Over U.S., CHI. TRIB., Nov. 11, 2010, at 15; John F. Burns, Yemen Bomb
Could Have Gone Off at East Coast, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2010, at A6; Kevin Johnson
& David Jackson, Bomb Timed to Detonate Over the East Coast, USA TODAY, Nov.
10, 2010, at 5A. The Times Square Bomber case got even more press recently. On
October 6, 2010, the Honorable Miriam Goldman Cedarbaum, a Manhattan federal
judge, sentenced the man responsible for the failed attack to life in prison. See Bruce
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fiction.291 In the context of a potential terrorist attack, perhaps involving
nuclear or chemical weapons, where the authorities have fairly reliable
information about an attack that could harm a substantial number of people, a rule such as that which the Tenth Circuit set forth might be proper.
The facts of Armijo, however, as will be discussed in more length in Part
V, do not justify this rule. Moreover, expanding the emergency-aid exception to a situation in which someone who is not in or near the home is
threatened with imminent harm inserts into Fourth Amendment jurisprudence a new exception that the Supreme Court has not endorsed. Given
that the Supreme Court has been vocal about how highly circumscribed
exceptions to the warrant and probable cause requirements should be,292
the Tenth Circuit should probably have left it to the Supreme Court to
expand this exception, if it saw fit to do so.
B. The Burden for Showing an Objectively Reasonable Belief That
Someone Is in Immediate Need of Assistance Is Too Low
The second problem with Armijo is that it creates an exception to
the Fourth Amendment that allows officers to enter a home on a substantially lower showing than probable cause. Armijo sets down a rule under
which a law enforcement officer may enter a home with no more than an
objectively reasonable belief that someone or something inside the home
will immediately cause harm to someone not in or near the home.293 This
begs the question: what quantum of proof must an officer have to formulate an objectively reasonable belief? In Armijo, the Tenth Circuit acknowledged that “the standard [for reasonable belief] is more lenient
than . . . [the standard for] probable cause.”294 As was shown in Part
Golding, Times Sq. Bomber’s Vile Rant as He Gets Life in Jail, N.Y. POST, Oct. 6,
2010, at 5.
291. For example, the television series 24, which prominently and repeatedly depicts terrorist attacks against the United States, premiered on November 6, 2001—less
than a month after the attacks of 9/11. See 24 on TV.com, http://www.tv.com/24/show/
3866/summary.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2010). The show’s final season aired in 2010,
and producers plan to make a movie based on the series. See Linda Stasi, Last Minute;
Finally, Peace for “24” . . . Until the Movie, N.Y. POST, May 25, 2010, at 69.
292. See supra notes 22, 31 & 287.
293. Armijo ex rel. Armijo Sanchez v. Peterson, 601 F.3d 1065, 1071 (10th Cir.
2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1473 (2011).
294. Id. (quoting United States v. Gambino-Zavala, 539 F.3d 1221, 1225 (10th
Cir. 2008)). Probable cause is defined as knowledge of facts sufficient “to warrant a
man of reasonable caution in the belief” that a person committed a crime or that
evidence of a crime will be found at a particular place. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No.
1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2639 (2009) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S.
160, 175–76 (1949)). However, the Tenth Circuit acknowledged in Armijo that “the
standard [for reasonable belief] is more lenient than [the standard for] probable

R

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NMX\41-1\NMX106.txt

Spring 2011]

unknown

LOWERING STANDARDS

Seq: 51

16-NOV-11

11:07

119

III.C, the reasonable belief burden is extraordinarily low. So long as the
officer knows facts from which a judge, trained in both logic and Fourth
Amendment doctrine, can create a plausible chain of inference to the desired fact, the Tenth Circuit tends to find the officer had an objectively
reasonable basis to believe the fact existed.295 The Tenth Circuit has even
allowed officers to engage in some degree of speculation in arriving at its
objectively reasonable belief, such as speculating whether any person is
inside the house they seek to enter.296
It is not clear that the Supreme Court intended the standard for an
objectively reasonable belief in the emergency-aid context to be lower
than the standard for probable cause, or at least as much lower as the
Tenth Circuit has made it. What the Supreme Court demanded, after all,
was an objectively reasonable basis for believing that the fact—that
someone inside the house needs immediate aid—was true.297 The Court
did not ask merely for an objectively reasonable basis for believing that
cause.” Armijo, 601 F.3d at 1071 (10th Cir. 2010). It is not clear that this conclusion
was correct, as the Tenth Circuit bases it solely on the fact that the Supreme Court in
Brigham City v. Stuart did not require probable cause to enter under the emergencyaid exception. See.Gambino-Zavala, 539 F.3d at 1225 (describing the Najar opinion as
“explaining the Supreme Court in Brigham City did not require the government to
show the officers had probable cause”); United States v. Najar, 451 F.3d 710, 718
(10th Cir. 2006) (noting that the Supreme Court did not “require probable cause in
this type of exigent circumstances [i.e., emergency aid]”) (citing Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006)). As discussed supra Part II.C, the Supreme Court likely used
the “objectively reasonable basis to believe” standard, rather than the probable cause
standard, because probable cause implies a nexus to criminal conduct and there is no
reason to require criminal conduct to justify entry under the emergency-aid exception.
The standards require suspicion of different things, but do not clearly require a different quantum of suspicion.
295. See supra Part III.C.1.
296. See, e.g., United States v. Layman, 244 Fed. Appx. 206, 211 (10th Cir. 2007)
(permitting the officers to speculate that a person was inside a mobile home and
might be incapacitated based on strong chemical fumes and evidence that someone
lived there). But see Lundstrom v. Romero, 616 F.3d 1108, 1124 (10th Cir. 2010) (finding officers’ belief that a child was inside the house unreasonable in the face of the
homeowner’s assertion to the contrary and the tipster’s suggestion that he might have
given the officers the wrong address); Cortez v. McCauley, 478 F.3d 1108, 1124 (10th
Cir. 2007) (chastising the officers for having “nothing, beyond innuendo and speculation, to establish objectively reasonable grounds of an emergency”).
297. Michigan v. Fisher, 130 S. Ct. 546, 548 (2009) (“This ‘emergency aid exception’ . . . requires only an objectively reasonable basis for believing that a person
within the house is in need of immediate aid[.]”) (emphasis added) (internal alterations, citations, and quotation marks omitted); Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 400 (“In this
case we consider whether police may enter a home without a warrant when they have
an objectively reasonable basis for believing that an occupant is seriously injured or
imminently threatened with such injury.”) (emphasis added).
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the fact might be true.298 Actual belief in a fact is objectively reasonable
only if there is some degree of perceived probability that the fact is
true.299
Moreover, the Supreme Court did not require law enforcement officers to have an objectively reasonable belief, but rather to have an objectively reasonable basis to believe. This basis must be knowledge of
other facts from which one may reasonably—not possibly or plausibly—
infer the ultimate fact. One would hope that a reasonable law enforcement officer would not believe a person is in immediate peril unless that
officer had some non-nominal amount of information leading to that conclusion. The Tenth Circuit’s overly permissive test appears to dictate that
an officer’s belief in a fact is objectively reasonable so long as there exists
some fact from which one could reason that the fact is possibly true, no
matter how implausible it may be in light of other circumstances.
Second, the Tenth Circuit’s rationale for holding that the objectively
reasonable basis standard is more lenient than the probable cause standard leaves much to be desired. It appears that the court based this important conclusion on the fact that the Supreme Court in Brigham City v.
Stuart and Michigan v. Fisher did not require probable cause in the emergency-aid context.300 As discussed in Parts III.B and III.D, the Supreme
Court likely used the “objectively reasonable basis to believe” standard,
rather than the probable cause standard, because probable cause implies
criminality, and there is no reason to require criminal conduct to justify
entry under the emergency-aid exception. The emergency-aid exception
applies when officers reasonably believe someone is in peril, and not
when they suspect that they will find criminal conduct or evidence of
criminality. The two standards thus require suspicion of different things,
but do not clearly require a different quantum of suspicion.
One might suggest that the “objectively reasonable belief” standard
set forth in Brigham City v. Stuart and Michigan v. Fisher is a re-articulation of the “reasonable suspicion” standard used in the context of less298. Again, the fact to which the Supreme Court referred was that entry is necessary to render aid to, or avert imminent harm to, someone inside the house. See
Fisher, 130 S. Ct. at 548; Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 400.
299. For example, one might subjectively believe that he or she is the target of a
foreign government’s assassination plot. The fact may well be true; but, without some
degree of proof, few would find that belief to be objectively reasonable.
300. See Gambino-Zavala, 539 F.3d at 1225 (“[T]he Supreme Court has explained
that the standard is more lenient than the more stringent probable cause standard.”)
(citing United States v. Najar, 451 F.3d 710, 718 (10th Cir. 2006); Najar, 451 F.3d at
718 (noting that the Supreme Court did not “require probable cause in this type of
exigent circumstances [i.e., emergency aid]”) (citing Brigham City, 547 U.S. 398
(2006)).
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intrusive searches and seizures, such as Terry stops.301 That conclusion
seems baseless and flawed. To satisfy the reasonable suspicion standard,
an officer need have only “some minimal level of objective justification”
for executing the search, “something more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch.”302 This standard is easy to meet.303 Probable cause, on the other hand,
“exists where the facts and circumstances within [an officer’s]
knowledge and of which [he] had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable
caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed,” and that evidence bearing on that offense will be found in
the place to be searched.304

In other words, probable cause is present when an officer is aware of
facts sufficient to warrant a reasonable man in believing a fact is true, and
the reasonable basis standard of Brigham City v. Stuart is satisfied when
the officer has an objectively reasonable basis for believing a fact is
true.305 These two standards sound the same. It is not clear that the quantum of proof necessary to apply the emergency-aid exception is less than
the quantum of proof necessary to establish probable cause.
If Brigham City v. Stuart and Michigan v. Fisher are any indication,
the quantum of proof necessary to have an objectively reasonable basis to
believe someone is in need of immediate aid is relatively high. In Brigham City v. Stuart, the police officers observed multiple adults trying to
restrain a minor, saw the minor punch one of the adults in the face, and
saw the adult spit blood.306 The only thing left for the officers to surmise
was whether the conflict was going to escalate further; there was already

301. For a description of a Terry stop, see supra note 283.
302. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 27 (1968)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
303. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990) (“Reasonable suspicion is a less
demanding standard than probable cause . . . .”); United States v. DeJear, 552 F.3d
1196, 1200 (10th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he level of suspicion required for reasonable suspicion is ‘considerably less’ than proof by a preponderance of the evidence or that required for probable cause.”) (quoting United States v. Lopez, 518 F.3d 790, 799 (10th
Cir. 2008)); Sisneros v. Fisher, 685 F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1214 (D.N.M. 2010) (Browning,
J.) (“[S]howing reasonable suspicion is a low burden that is generally easy for an
officer to meet.”).
304. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2639 (2009)
(quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1949)) (alterations in original, internal citation omitted).
305. 547 U.S. 398, 404–406 (2006).
306. See Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 400–401 (2006).
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violence occurring. Similarly, in Michigan v. Fisher, the officers were responding to a 911 call of a man “going crazy.”307 They arrived to see the
front yard of the house in shambles and observed Mr. Fisher pacing
around, yelling, and throwing things.308 Again, the officers could see violence occurring inside the house.309 The difference between Brigham City
v Stuart and Michigan v. Fisher is that, in Michigan v. Fisher, the officers
could not see the would-be victim, but it was fairly inferable that there
was a victim.310 In both cases, the likelihood of harm, and the immediacy
thereof, were apparent. In both cases, the officers would easily satisfy the
reasonable basis standard, even if the quantum of proof necessary were
commensurate with that of probable cause.
By contrast, in Armijo, the officers were acting on a called-in bomb
threat and a series of rumors, most of which suggested that there was no
bomb.311 That is not to suggest that the authorities wrote off the bomb
threat as harmless, but the officials acted in a manner suggesting they
believed the bomb threat was a ruse. They had information, upon which
their actions show they relied heavily, suggesting that the bomb threat
was not the highest priority. Moreover, while it is questionable whether
the officers reasonably believed that there was a bomb, their belief that
Chris was involved was scarcely above the level of speculation. All they
had to go on was the first-name “Chris,” a suspected gang affiliation, and
a suspected connection to two particular schools, very little of which they
verified.312
If Chris were a parolee,313 probationer,314 or part of any other class
of persons that the Supreme Court has found to have a decreased expec307. See Michigan v. Fisher, 130 S. Ct. 546, 547 (2009).
308. See id.
309. Id.
310. As it turned out, there was no one else inside Mr. Fisher’s house in danger
from his rampage, see Fisher, 130 S. Ct. at 548–49, but the officers were reasonable in
believing that someone was inside because it is the unusual case in which a person will
yell and throw things at nobody.
311. Armijo ex rel. Armijo Sanchez v. Peterson, 601 F.3d 1065, 1068 (10th Cir.
2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1473 (2011).
312. See id. If the reasonable basis standard is as low as the standard for reasonable suspicion, these tips likely meet the mark. If it is as high as probable cause, they
probably do not.
313. See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 850–55 (2006) (noting that parolees
have a decreased expectation of privacy because they are still in the legal custody of
the state, and holding that a California law authorizing suspicionless searches of parolees’ homes pursuant to waivers that are a condition of parole release are
constitutional).
314. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118–22 (2001) (noting that a probationer has a decreased expectation of privacy, and holding that a warrantless search of
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tation of privacy in their home, the Armijo decision would be easier to
swallow. Chris was accused of a crime, it is true, and a serious one, but
the Supreme Court has rejected the idea that a person can waive their
Fourth Amendment right to privacy by being accused of committing a
crime, even when the evidence is clear.315 The evidence in this case was
far from clear. Chris’s expectation of privacy was in full force. Moreover,
this was not a case in which Chris was in his car or some other location
with an inherently decreased expectation of privacy; he was asleep in his
home, where the Fourth Amendment’s protections are at their strongest.316 The Fourth Amendment therefore should have protected Chris and
entitled him to demand that law enforcement officers accumulate probable cause before entering his home, even if they were legitimately working under exigent circumstances. Instead, because the officers were put in
a difficult position, the Tenth Circuit compromised Chris’s constitutional
rights to relieve the officers of liability. Under the Supreme Court’s precedent, the officers’ conduct should have been deterred and not
rewarded.
C. The Tenth Circuit’s Expansion of the Emergency-Aid Doctrine to
Persons Not in or Near the Home Turns Into a Fourth Amendment
Loophole
The third problem with the Armijo decision, which is largely a result
of the first two, is that it applied the emergency-aid exception to what

a probationer’s apartment based on reasonable suspicion was constitutional where the
probationer’s conditions of probation included a Fourth Amendment waiver); Griffin
v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874 (1987) (explaining that probationers “do not enjoy
‘the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but only . . . conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special [probation] restrictions.’ ”) (quoting
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972)).
315. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 391 (1978) (“[T]he State urges that by
shooting Officer Headricks, Mincey forfeited any reasonable expectation of privacy . . . . [T]his reasoning would impermissibly convict the suspect even before the
evidence against him was gathered.”).
316. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 54 (2000) (“One’s expectation of privacy in an automobile and of freedom in its operation are significantly different from the traditional expectation of privacy and freedom in one’s residence.”)
(quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976)); Cardwell v.
Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) (“One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor
vehicle because its function is transportation and it seldom serves as one’s residence
or as the repository of personal effects.”); see also Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton,
515 U.S. 646, 656–57 (1995) (“Particularly with regard to medical examinations and
procedures . . . ‘students within the school environment have a lesser expectation of
privacy than members of the population generally.’ ”) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O.,
469 U.S. 325, 348 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring)).
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was, in reality, a law-enforcement-oriented entry. As discussed above, the
general rule is that even where exigent circumstances exist, officers need
probable cause in addition to exigent circumstances to lawfully enter a
home without a warrant.317 It is only in the emergency-aid context—
where the law enforcement officer is acting as a rescuer rather than a
criminal investigator—that exigent circumstances can take the place of
both a warrant and probable cause. In Armijo, the Tenth Circuit took an
exception intended to except rescuers from Fourth Amendment scrutiny
and applied it to a general law enforcement investigation.
1. The Emergency-Aid Exception Should Not Apply to What Is
Clearly Investigative Conduct
The Tenth Circuit admitted that its new-found exception is aimed at
the nexus between averting crimes and protecting citizens. The court
stated: “Would-be attackers and victims are frequently not in the same
place, yet a requirement that they must be for exigent circumstances to
occur could hamper law enforcement and compromise public safety.”318
Almost all crimes have victims, and stopping the criminal from committing the crime will always avert the harm to the person or property that
the crime might cause. In a sense, then, almost all preemptive law enforcement activities could also be categorized as emergency aid.319 But the
truth is that the officers in Armijo were acting in their law enforcement
capacity, not their rescuer capacity. The officers in Armijo may have believed that, by stopping the criminal who might cause harm to the victims,
the officers could avert the injuries to those victims.320 Based on that be317. See supra note 36. The majority in Armijo dismisses Chief Judge Briscoe’s
statement that the exigent circumstances exception requires probable cause by citation to the emergency-aid cases. See Armijo, 601 F.3d at 1075 (“The dissent alternatively posits that, no matter whether exigent circumstances existed, the officers
needed probable cause to enter the home. Not so. Officers do not need probable
cause if they face exigent circumstances in an emergency.”) (citations omitted). The
general rule, however, is that probable cause and exigent circumstances are both required; the emergency-aid context is the exception to that general rule. See supra
Parts III.A.4 & III.D.
318. Armijo, 601 F.3d at 1071.
319. The Supreme Court has implicitly rejected such a conclusion by defining
probable cause as knowledge of facts sufficient “to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed.” Safford Unified
Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2639 (2009) (emphasis added) (quoting
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–76)).
320. Of course, the analysis cannot focus on the subjective intent of the officer,
both because it would be infeasible to determine the officer’s subjective intent in
every case and because Fourth Amendment analysis almost always ignores the actor’s
subjective intent. See Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404–405 (2006) (“An ac-
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lief, however, they entered the home to apprehend a suspect—not to rescue a victim.321 Because the officers were acting as criminal investigators,
they were bound by the probable cause and warrant requirements set
forth in the Fourth Amendment. The emergency-aid exception is inapplicable in the criminal investigation context, and the exigent circumstances
exception requires officers to have probable cause. The officers’ entry
was thus unconstitutional.
This conclusion is not to suggest that the proper analysis involves
discerning the subjective intent of the investigating officers to ascertain
whether they intended to investigate a crime or to rescue a victim. As the
Supreme Court has emphasized, the proper analysis is objective and the
courts should not consider the subjective intent of the officers.322 Rather,
by observing the facts objectively and considering the actions that the
officers take, one can usually discern whether the officers are engaged in
conduct intended to immediately rescue someone or conduct intended to
further a criminal investigation. For example, in both Michigan v. Fisher
and Brigham City v. Stuart, the officers observed a dangerous situation
and immediately acted in an effort to stop a particular actor from engaging in a foreseeable act and harming a specific victim.
In Armijo, by contrast, officers followed leads and put together
clues to track down an individual whom they believed might be plotting
to harm a group of people. They did not know that Chris was involved, or
how he might be involved; but, they wanted to find out. As discussed in
Part V.D, it is unlikely that the officers believed Chris was inside the
house if they also believed he was going to blow up or shoot up the
school. If they did not think Chris was inside his house, their only plausible purpose in entering would be to find evidence or to learn Chris’s
whereabouts. If they did believe Chris was inside the house, their only
plausible purpose would be to find out how Chris was involved in plotting
whatever harm was to befall Oñate High School. In either case, the officers were investigating. Entering a person’s house for that purpose re-

tion is ‘reasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment, regardless of the individual officer’s state of mind, ‘as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify [the]
action.’ ”) (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978)).
321. For an explanation why the officers could not have reasonably believed that
their entry was immediately necessary to rescue anyone, see infra Part V.D.
322. Michigan v. Fisher, 130 S. Ct. 546, 548–49 (2009) (“This ‘emergency aid exception’ does not depend on the officers’ subjective intent or the seriousness of any
crime they are investigating when the emergency arises.”); id. (“[T]he test, as we have
said, is not what [the officer] believed, but whether there was ‘an objectively reasonable basis for believing’ that medical assistance was needed, or persons were in danger[.]”) (quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 406 (2006)).
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quires probable cause and a warrant, or probable cause and exigent
circumstances.
2. Avoiding the 24 Effect323
Armijo’s holding, “that the exigent circumstances exception permits
warrantless home entries when officers reasonably believe that some actor or object in a house may immediately cause harm to persons or property not in or near the house,”324 has some facial appeal, especially to a
fan of the television series 24.325 One can envision Jack Bauer receiving a
vital clue, which suggests that the detonator to a remote-controlled explosive device is inside a house, as seconds tick away on a digital timer. It
would save hundreds or thousands of lives if he burst in and disarmed the
device before it is too late. No one would fault him for entering the house
under those circumstances.
The writers of 24, however, have never constrained Jack Bauer’s actions by the Constitution’s Fourth Amendment, and rightly so. He is a
fictional character whose hunches are always right and who never fails to
catch the bad guy and protect the country—subject to a few minor disasters throughout the season to keep the viewers interested. Moreover, one
never sees Jack Bauer burst into the wrong house, spot a gun or some
drugs on a table, and arrest the person inside on possession charges. In
reality, however, drug and gun possession charges are standard fare in
close-call Fourth Amendment cases.326
In the real world, police officers are fallible, and that fallibility forms
part of the purpose of the Fourth Amendment’s protections.327 If police
323. 24 was a television series starring Kiefer Sutherland. See 24 (TV Series
2001–2010), WWW.IMBD.COM, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0285331 (last visited Mar. 6,
2011). Kiefer Sutherland portrayed Jack Bauer, a preternaturally skilled and intuitive
counter-terrorism agent. See id.
324. Armijo ex rel. Armijo Sanchez v. Peterson, 601 F.3d 1065, 1071 (10th Cir.
2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1473 (2011).
325. See supra note 323.
326. See, e.g., United States v. Najar, 451 F.3d 710, 712 (10th Cir. 2006) (police
responded to a 911 call, defendant charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm); United States v. Huffman, 461 F.3d 777, 780–81 (6th Cir. 2006) (police responded to a 911 call reporting shots fired, defendant charged with being a felon in
possession of a firearm and ammunition).
327. These statements are not to suggest that the efforts of our nation’s law enforcement officers are not appreciated. They risk their lives on a daily basis to make
our society safer. One would be hard-pressed to find a more noble and selfless profession. The Founding Fathers, however, believed that government actors’ conduct
should be restrained, and the Fourth Amendment is one of those constraints. The
Author agrees. And, when law enforcement officers or other government agents violate the Fourth Amendment, there must be repercussions.
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officers only broke into the houses of criminals, always found evidence,
and always made a proper arrest, the Fourth Amendment would be
largely unnecessary. At least as much as the procedures required by the
Fourth Amendment protect those who have committed crimes, they
should also protect those of us in society who have nothing to hide, who
have committed no crimes, and who are not in possession of material
evidence. Just because police officers are attempting to prevent crime and
injury does not mean they should receive a carte blanche to enter innocent individuals’ homes on tips and hunches. Neither logic nor the Fourth
Amendment permits officers such freedom.
The policy basis for the exclusionary rule supports keeping Fourth
Amendment exceptions highly circumscribed.328 The exclusionary rule is
intended to deter police officers from forsaking the Fourth Amendment’s
probable cause and warrant requirements on a hunch that there is evidence in a person’s home.329 To keep police officers from entering the
homes of anyone whom they happen to suspect is guilty of wrongdoing,
the exclusionary rule prohibits the government from using against a criminal defendant evidence obtained in contravention of the Fourth Amendment.330 As the Supreme Court has explained, the exclusionary rule is not
an individual right, but rather is intended as a general deterrent to stop
officers from violating the Fourth Amendment by withholding from them
the fruits of such unlawful entries.331 The law does not want to withhold
the evidence, but it does want to stop officers from entering people’s
homes without meeting the prerequisites of probable cause and a warrant. Indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that the suppression of reliable, probative evidence is the price, and a high price, for
the security that the Fourth Amendment provides.332 Thus, the policies

328. See supra note 39.
329. See id.
330. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960) (stating that the exclusionary rule’s purpose “is to deter—to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty
in the only effectively available way—by removing the incentive to disregard it”).
331. Id.; Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141 (2009) (“[T]he exclusionary
rule is not an individual right and applies only where it ‘result[s] in appreciable deterrence.’ ”) (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 909 (1984)).
332. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 979 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (“It is of course true that the exclusionary rule exerts a high price—the loss of
probative evidence of guilt. But that price is one courts have often been required to
pay to serve important social goals.”); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 355 (1983)
(“The price of [law enforcement] effectiveness, however, is intrusion on individual
interests protected by the Fourth Amendment.”); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339
U.S. 56, 67–68 (1950) (Black, J., dissenting) (“Unquestionably [the exclusionary rule]
will now and then permit a guilty person to escape conviction because of hasty or ill-
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undergirding the exclusionary rule also support the notion that courts
should be skeptical of expanding law-enforcement-oriented exceptions to
the Fourth Amendment. The Tenth Circuit should not have further cut
away at the Fourth Amendment’s protections as it did in Armijo.
D. To the Extent That Armijo Properly Reflects Federal Law, the Tenth
Circuit Misapplied That Law
Again, the Tenth Circuit in Armijo held “that the exigent circumstances exception permits warrantless home entries when officers reasonably believe that some actor or object in a house may immediately cause
harm to persons or property not in or near the house,” even in the absence of probable cause.333 As was briefly mentioned above, the Supreme
Court has suggested, but never held, that entry into a home might be
authorized under such circumstances.334 It is thus possible that the Supreme Court, if presented with the proper fact pattern, would fashion a
rule similar to that which the Tenth Circuit created. To the extent that
Armijo properly states the law according to the Supreme Court’s standards, it misapplies that law.
It is not clear how the Tenth Circuit found that the rule was proper
to apply under the facts of Armijo. The officers were investigating a bomb
threat and rumors that a bomb threat—not an actual bomb—would coincide with a school shooting. First, it is not immediately apparent how the
officers believed Chris could have detonated a bomb at the school, or
fired a gun at the school, if he was inside his home. While remote-detonation devices exist, the odds that a sixteen-year-old boy would have one
powerful enough to reach from Chris’s house to the school seem minimal.
There was nothing to suggest that Chris would have such a device. In
other words, the reasonableness of the officers’ belief that Chris was going to blow up Oñate High School from inside his home, based on the
telephone call and two clues linking Chris to those calls, was
questionable.
Moreover, the rumors about which the police were aware arguably
linked Chris to a false bomb threat—not a genuine one—which was in-

advised action on the part of enforcement officers. But the same may be said of the
requirements of the Fourth Amendment . . . .”).
333. Armijo ex rel. Armijo Sanchez v. Peterson, 601 F.3d 1065, 1071 (10th Cir.
2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1473 (2011).
334. See Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 95 (1990) (“The Minnesota Supreme
Court applied essentially the correct standard . . . observ[ing] that a warrantless intrusion may be justified by . . . the risk of danger to the police or to other persons
inside or outside the dwelling.”) (quoting State v. Olson, 436 N.W.2d 92, 97 (Minn.
1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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tended to lure students out of the school building. It is thus even more
doubtful that the facts about which the officers were aware could have
generated an objectively reasonable belief that Chris was going to
detonate a bomb at the Oñate High School from inside his house. It is
also obvious that nobody inside Chris’s house was going to be one of the
shooters who might be taking aim at students as they exited the school.
The rumors suggested that the gang members who would open fire on the
students would bring the guns to school—i.e., they would be among the
students evacuated and not shooting from houses. It is, overall, hard to
understand how an officer could reasonably believe someone inside
Chris’s house could have immediately caused harm to a person or property not in or near the house—i.e., could have detonated a bomb at the
school or shot at the exiting students. The officers’ belief that Chris was in
his house thus undercuts the reasonableness of their belief that he could
be one of the persons who was going to bomb or shoot-up the school, and
thus vitiates their “reasonable belief” that someone in or near the house
“may immediately cause harm to persons or property not in or near the
house.”335
The Tenth Circuit bent the rules to give the investigating officers a
break that Fourth Amendment law—even the rule that the court itself
created in Armijo—does not permit. The burden on the government to
justify application of the emergency-aid exception is supposed to be “especially heavy” when the government must justify warrantless entry into
a home.336 It appears that because the judges sympathized with the unfortunate predicament in which the officers were put they accepted the minimal evidence and reasoning the officers used, and then lowered the
burden until entry was permissible.337 Furthermore, the majority in
Armijo conceded that it was expanding, rather than applying, existing law
to reach its holding,338 which appears to run counter to the Supreme
Court’s admonition that exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant

335. Armijo, 601 F.3d at 1071.
336. See United States v. Najar, 451 F.3d 710, 717 (10th Cir. 2006). See also Welsh
v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749–50 (1984) (“Prior decisions of this Court . . . have
emphasized that . . . the police bear a heavy burden when attempting to demonstrate an urgent need that might justify warrantless searches or arrests.”) (internal
citation omitted).
337. See Armijo, 601 F.3d at 1071 (“The officers were between a rock and a hard
place.”).
338.
Id. (“We must decide whether the exigent circumstances exception only justifies warrantless entries into a house to aid a potential victim in the house, or if it also
justifies warrantless entries into a house to stop a person or property inside the house
from immediately harming people not in or near the house.”).
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requirement be “specifically established and well-delineated.”339 The officers’ entry into the Armijos’s home—assuming the facts in the light
most favorable to the Armijos—should have been found to be a Fourth
Amendment violation.
VI. CONCLUSION
A person’s home is his or her castle. The Founding Fathers, through
the Fourth Amendment, and the Supreme Court, through its caselaw,
have emphasized how important it is to a free society that citizens be
protected from unwanted governmental intrusion into their lives. That
protection has been held all the more sacred when the government seeks
to enter a person’s home. Over time, the Supreme Court has created a
host of exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s protection. When the government’s only plausible purpose in seeking to enter a person’s home is
to investigate crime, however, the Supreme Court has consistently demanded probable cause, even when it does not require a warrant. The
emergency-aid exception—the situation in which the police officer is rescuing someone in immediate peril—has, to date, been the only exception
to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant and probable-cause requirements. In
Armijo ex rel. Armijo Sanchez v. Peterson, the Tenth Circuit created a
new exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant and probable-cause
requirements, and it did so in the context of a police investigation rather
than in the context of a rescue. By doing so, it opened the door to police
entries into a person’s house, without probable cause or a warrant, based
upon rumors or tips that someone inside the house might soon cause
harm to someone outside the house. This holding opens a dangerous
door. Law enforcement officers or federal district courts might stretch the
concept of “immediacy” even further than the Tenth Circuit in order to
justify warrantless searches of homes based on tips that the occupant
might soon commit a crime that might have a victim. To avoid this slippery slope, the Tenth Circuit should dub this newly created rule the simultaneous-school-bombing-and-shooting-threat exception and limit it to
the facts of Armijo.
339. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978) (“[S]earches conducted outside
the judicial process, without prior approval by a judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established
and well-delineated exceptions.”) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357
(1967)); see also Welsh, 466 U.S. at 749–50 (“Prior decisions of this Court . . . have
emphasized that exceptions to the warrant requirement are ‘few in number and carefully delineated,’ and that the police bear a heavy burden when attempting to demonstrate an urgent need that might justify warrantless searches or arrests.”) (quoting
United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 318 (1972)).

